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ROWINSKY V BRYAN INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT: DOES




The issue of sexual harassment has flooded the courtroom in the last
decade.1 In response, the United States Supreme Court has spoken out
on what is actionable as sexual harassment, specifically in the workplace.
2
In a landmark decision, the Court recognized both quid pro quo and hos-
tile environment sexual harassment as actionable claims under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3
1. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993) (defining
severe or pervasive conduct creating "abusive work environment"); Franklin v.
Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 63 (1992) (alleging teacher to student
sexual harassment under Title IX); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-67
(1986) (alleging sexual harassment by supervisor in violation of Title VII); Har-
tleip v. McNeilab, Inc., 83 F.3d 767, 770 (6th Cir. 1996) (asserting quid pro quo
sexual harassment); Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th
Cir.) (finding no liability on school district for peer hostile environment sexual
harassment under Title IX), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996); Fuller v. City of
Oakland, Cal., 47 F.3d 1522, 1525 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding city liable for Title VII
hostile work environment sexual harassment); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 508
(9th Cir. 1994) (alleging quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment
against employer); Chamberlin v. 101 Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 781 (1st Cir.
1990) (alleging quid pro quo sexual harassment); Lipsett v. University of Puerto
Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 884 (1st Cir. 1988) (alleging sexual harassment during partici-
pation in medical program); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 900 (11th
Cir. 1982) (alleging workplace sexual harassment); Wright v. Mason City Commu-
nity Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1414 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (asserting peer hostile
environment sexual harassment when school district failed to take remedial ac-
tion); Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 165 (N.D.N.Y.
1996) (alleging school administrators perpetuated sexually hostile learning envi-
ronment created by fellow students); Doe v. Petaluma City.Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp.
1415, 1417 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (granting motion for reconsideration of Title IX peer
hostile environment sexual harassment case under Title VII analysis); Redman v.
Lima City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 889 F. Supp. 288, 300 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (assert-
ing hostile work environment sexual harassment); Slaughter v. Waubonsee Com-
munity College, No. 94 C 2525, 1995 WL 579296, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1995)
(asserting that teacher offered to raise course grade in exchange for sexual favors);
Saad v. Stanley St. Treatment and Resources, Inc., No. CIV.A 92-11434-DPW, 1994
WL 846911, at *1 (D. Mass. May 20, 1994) (asserting existence of sexual hostile
work environment).
2. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-23 (defining "severe and pervasive" requirement
for establishing sexual harassment action); Mentor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 64-67
(recognizing quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment as actiona-
ble claims under Title VII).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994); see Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 57. The
Court stated that Title VII is not limited only to "economic" or "tangible" discrimi-
(969)
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Sexual harassment claims have also increased in the education envi-
ronment, 4 These claims involve situations in which a teacher sexually
harassed a student or a student sexually harassed a classmate. 5 The latter
situation, student-to-student or peer sexual harassment, is an increasingly
prevalent problem in the nation's schools.6
nation (otherwise known as quid pro quo harassment). See id. The Court also
recognized hostile environment sexual harassment. See id. at 67. The Court stated
that "[flor sexual harassment to be actionable [under a hostile environment the-
ory], it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the vic-
tim's] employment and create an abusive working environment.'" Id. at 67 (citing
Henson, 682 F.2d at 904). For a discussion of the relevant part of Title VII, see infra
note 67 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of Meritor Savings Bank
and workplace sexual harassment, see infra notes 74-95 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the difference between quid pro quo and hostile environment
sexual harassment, see infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Franklin, 503 U.S. at 63-64 (alleging teacher sexually harassed stu-
dent in school); Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1010 (asserting school district perpetuated
peer hostile environment sexual harassment when it failed to end harassing con-
duct); Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 884 (alleging sexual harassment in medical program);
Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1414 (alleging sexual harassment by peers at school creat-
ing hostile learning environment); Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 166-67 (asserting
school district failed to take remedial action to prevent sexually hostile learning
environment created by fellow students); Petaluma City, 949 F. Supp. at 1416-17
(alleging peer hostile environment sexual harassment and school district's failure
to take remedial action); Does v. Covington County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 930 F. Supp.
554, 572-74 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (using Title VII test to analyze school board's liability
under Title IX of Education Amendments Act of 1972 for teacher-to-student sex-
ual harassment); Slaughter, 1995 WL 579296, at *1 (asserting sexual discrimination
and sexual harassment against community college); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified
Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1297 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (alleging sexually hostile edu-
cation environment under Tite IX); Moire v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Med., 613 F.
Supp. 1360, 1366 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (alleging abusive environment sexual harassment
in educational context), aff'd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
5. See, e.g., Franklin, 503 U.S. at 63-65 (asserting Title IX sexual harassment
claim where teacher sexually harassed student); Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1009-10 (alleg-
ing peer hostile environment sexual harassment); Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1414
(same); Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 166 (alleging verbal and physical sexual harass-
ment creating hostile learning environment); Petaluma City, 949 F. Supp. at 1416
(alleging peer hostile environment sexual harassment); Slaughter, 1995 WL 579296,
at *1 (asserting teacher offered to raise course grade in exchange for sexual fa-
vors). For a detailed discussion of the development of peer sexual harassment case
law, see infra notes 96-142 and accompanying text.
6. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN EDUCATIONAL FOUNDA-
TION, HOSTILE HALLWAYS" THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS 5-6 (1993) (surveying 1632 students in public school, grades eight
through eleven, about school-related harassment) [hereinafter HOSTILE HALL.
wAYS]; Alexandra A. Bodnar, Arming Students For Battle: Amending Title IX to Combat
the Sexual Harassment of Students By Students in Primary and Secondary Schoo 5 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 549, 554 (1996) (commenting that sexual harassment is
not rare in schools); Sylvia Hermann Bukoffsky, Note, School District Liability for
Student Inflicted Sexual Harassment: School Administrators Learn a Lesson Under Title IX
42 WAYNE L. REV. 171, 172 (1995) (stating that schools generally do not have policy
to address peer sexual harassment despite its prevalence); Kirsten M. Eriksson,
Note, What Our Children Are Really Learning in School: Using Title IX to Combat Peer
Sexual Harassment, 83 GEO. L.J. 1799, 1801 (1995) (calling sexual harassment in
2
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"Eighty percent of public school students experience some type of
sexual harassment by the time they reach the twelfth grade." 7 The harass-
ment can begin as early as kindergarten. 8 Furthermore, student-to-stu-
dent sexual harassment causes significant harm to the victims. 9 Students
suffer from feelings of embarrassment, fear and low self-esteem and expe-
schools "a difficult and persistent problem"); Jollee Faber, Expanding Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 to Prohibit Student to Student Sexual Harassment, 2
UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 85, 143 (1992) ("Student to student sexual harassment is a
serious problem on college campuses."); Victoria E. Lovato, Note, Doe v. Petaluma
City School District: A School Counselor's Qualified Immunity, A License to Tolerate Peer
Sexual Harassment?, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 381, 381 (1996) (stating that students face
growing problem of sexual harassment in schools); Jill Suzanne Miller, Title VI and
Title VII: Happy Together As a Resolution to Title IX Peer Sexual Harassment Claims, 1995
U. ILL. L. REv. 699, 701 (1995) (citing survey suggesting that "sexual harassment of
school children has become a serious problem"); Stacey R. Rinestine, Comment,
Terrorism on the Playground: What Can Be Done?, 32 DUQ. L. REv. 799, 800 (1994)
(discussing growing number of reports of sexual harassment in schools); Monica
L. Sherer, Comment, No LongerJust Child's Play: School Liability Under Title IX For Peer
Sexual Harassment, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 2119, 2167 (1993) (stating that "[peer sexual
harassment] is a legitimate and pervasive problem in elementary and secondary
schools"); Shelley Donald Coolidge, In Halls of Learning, Students Get Lessons In Sex-
ual Harassment, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 18, 1996, available in 1996 WL
5044305 (recognizing "prevalence of sexual harassment in America's schools");
Aaron Epstein, Harassment Case Rejected By Justices: The Supreme Court Had Been Asked
to Find SchoolDistricts Liable for Student Behavior, PHILA. INQUIRER, Oct. 8, 1996, at Al
(commenting that nation's schools are "beset by cases of sexual harassment"); Amy
Saltzman, It's Not Just Teasing Sexual Harassment Starts Young: Here's How Some Schools
Discourage It, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 6, 1993, at 73-77 (discussing survey on
prevalence of sexual harassment in schools and growing number of programs to
combat peer sexual harassment).
The AAUW Survey is a widely quoted survey documenting various forms of
sexual harassment experienced by students in school-related activities. See HOSTILE
HALLWAYS, supra, at 4. Results of the study show that four out of five students
(81%) are the targets of sexual harassment in school. See id. at 7. The harassment
takes various forms from gestures, looks and comments to pinching, touching and
being forced to do something sexual other than kissing. See id. at 8. Moreover, the
majority of the harassment was student-to-student sexual harassment. See id. at 11.
For a detailed discussion of the AAUW study, see Bodnar, supra, at 556-59.
In this Note, the phrases "student-to-student sexual harassment" and "peer
sexual harassment" will be used interchangeably.
7. Bukoffsky, supra note 6, at 171.
8. See HOSTILE HALLWAYS, supra note 6, at 5; Bodnar, supra note 6, at 554; see
also Ruth Shalit, Romper Room: Sexual Harassment-By Tots, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 29,
1993, at 13 (recounting story about five-year-old boy leading female classmate into
room, pulling down pants and simulating sex). For a discussion of peer sexual
harassment, see infra notes 96-142 and accompanying text.
9. See Bodnar, supra note 6, at 559-65 (discussing academic and physical ef-
fects of peer sexual harassment); Faber, supra note 6, at 87 (finding victims of
student-to-student sexual harassment suffer significant harm); Sherer, supra note 6,
at 2133-35 (discussing effects of peer sexual harassment); Bill Hewitt, Bitter Lessons:
School Days Aren't Golden Rule Days Anymore, and Some Parents Are Suing to Keep Their
Kids From Being Abused, PEOPLE, Oct. 28, 1996, at 53 (depicting how peer sexual
harassment affects victims and their families); Kristina Sauerwein, Sex Harassment
Makes School Hellish for Girl, ST. Louis POsT-DIsPATCH, Nov. 26, 1995, at 01A
(describing emotional and physical effects of peer sexual harassment on victims).
1997] NOTE
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rience academic and physical harm.10 In a larger context, student-to-stu-
dent sexual harassment perpetuates discrimination and sexism in
society."1 Nevertheless, assigning liability for student-to-student sexual
harassment presents a quandary.' 2
Recently, school districts have become the target of suits involving this
type of sexual harassment. 13 Victims of peer sexual harassment are filing
actions under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (Title
10. See Sherer, supra note 6, at 2134. Sexual harassment affects the victim's
ability to perform and causes students to transfer schools and even to move out of
town. See id. (discussing how sexual harassment leads victims to transfer from par-
ticular courses, causes tardiness and prevents victims from pursuing certain ca-
reers). Sexual harassment can also lead to thoughts of suicide. See Bodnar, supra
note 6, at 560-61 (discussing emotional effects of peer sexual harassment).
Researchers characterize the emotional implications of sexual harassment as
"sexual harassment syndrome," which includes symptoms such as:
-general depression, as manifested by changes in eating and sleeping pat-
terns, and vague complaints of aches and pains that prevent the student
from attending class or completing work;
-undefined dissatisfaction with [classes];
-sense of powerlessness, helplessness and vulnerability;
-loss of academic self-confidence and decline in academic performance;
-feelings of isolation from other students;
-changes in attitudes or behaviors regarding sexual relationships;
-irritability with family and friends;
-fear and anxiety;
-inability to concentrate; [and]
-alcohol and drug dependency.
Bodnar, supra note 6, at 560-61 (citing Vita C. Rabinowitz, Coping with Sexual Har-
assment, in IVORY POWER: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS 103, 112-113 (Michelle
A. Paludi ed., 1990)).
11. See Bodnar, supra note 6, at 565 (stating that law must ensure equality as
way of life); Sherer, supra note 6, at 2135 (stating that early education on this topic
will teach children "respect, dignity and human decency").
12. Compare Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir.)
(holding school district not liable for peer hostile environment sexual harassment
under Title IX absent direct discrimination by school district based on sex), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996), with Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935
F. Supp. 162, 177 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying defendant's summary judgment mo-
tion in Title IX peer hostile environment sexual harassment claim because school
district may be liable if it had actual notice of harassment and failed to take appro-
priate action and concluding that whether school had actual notice is question of
fact), Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1419 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(applying Title VII analysis to Title IX claim to determine school district liability
for peer hostile environment sexual harassment), and Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch.
Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1022 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (finding Title VII analysis appropri-
ate for holding school district liable for peer hostile environment sexual harass-
ment under Title IX).
13. See generally Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1009-10 (filing suit against school district
for failure to stop peer sexual harassment); Wright v. Mason City Community Sch.
Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1414 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (alleging sexual harassment by
peers at school); Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 166-67 (asserting school district failed to
take remedial action to prevent hostile learning environment created by fellow
students); Petaluma City, 949 F. Supp. at 1415 (granting motion for reconsideration
in peer hostile environment sexual harassment case involving school district's fail-
ure to take remedial action); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F.
4
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IX) 1 4 against school districts for failing to take appropriate measures to
end the harassment.1 5 Title IX prohibits discrimination based on sex in
any federally funded education program or activity. 16 Courts addressing
this issue are divided on whether a school district can be liable for peer
sexual harassment under Title IX.1
7
Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (alleging sexually hostile education environment
under Title IX).
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
15. See generally Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1009-10 (alleging that school officials
"condoned and caused hostile environment sexual harassment" in violation of Ti-
tle IX); Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 166-67 (alleging school's insufficient response to
sexual harassment by peers perpetuated hostile environment); Petaluma City, 949 F.
Supp. at 1416 (alleging peer hostile environment sexual harassment under Title
IX when school district failed to stop harassing conduct).
Plaintiffs are hesitant to bring such actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because
courts have repeatedly refused to apply § 1983 to a school setting. See DorothyJ. v.
Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 731 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding no custodial rela-
tionship between school district and victim of peer sexual harassment is created
through mandated school attendance laws); Black v. Indiana Area Sch. Dist., 985
F.2d 707, 714 (3d Cir. 1993) (refusing to apply § 1983 analysis in school setting
and finding no special relationship between victim and school official); Bruneau,
935 F. Supp. at 179 ("The Plaintiff cannot state a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on a
Title IX right against the Defendants."); see also Elizabeth J. Gant, Comment, Apply-
ing Title VII "Hostile Work Environment"Analysis to Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972-An Avenue of Relief for Victims of Student-to-Student Sexual Harassment in The
Schools, 98 DIcK. L. Rv. 489, 493 (discussing downfalls of sexual harassment cases
under § 1983). In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must allege that the state actor
deprived the plaintiff "of a right secured by the Constitution." Id. at 491. The
Supreme Court has held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment restricts the state's power to act against private parties because nothing in the
language of the clause requires a state to protect the life, liberty and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). The Court, however, acknowledged
that, although under certain circumstances the Constitution may impose an af-
firmative duty on the state to protect its citizens, such a duty does not exist in every
situation. See id. at 200; see also D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical
Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1371 (3d Cir. 1992) (rejecting contention that school had
affirmative duty to protect students from harm); William D. Valente, Liability for
Teacher's Sexual Misconduct with Students-Closing and Opening Vistas, 74 EDuc. L.
REP. 1021, 1030 (1992) (comparing relief under § 1983 and Title IX); Gant, supra,
at 493 n.35 (citing cases that have rejected actions brought under § 1983).
16. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). The statute states in part: "No person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be de-
nied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. Programs or activities
excluded from this provision are religious educational institutions, military train-
ing institutions, single sex public educational institutions, Girl and Boy Scouts,
Boys and Girls State, father-son or mother-daughter activities at educational institu-
tions and beauty pageants. See id. § 1681 (a) (3)-(9).
17. Compare Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1016 (holding Title IX does not impose lia-
bility on schools for peer hostile environment sexual harassment absent evidence
that school directly discriminated based on sex), with Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 177
(allowing Title IX peer hostile environment sexual harassment action against
school for failing to take remedial action to stop sexual harassment), Petaluma City,
949 F. Supp. at 1420-21 (rejecting Rowinsky approach and adopting Title VII analy-
5
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This Note examines the propriety of holding school districts liable for
peer sexual harassment under Title IX in light of Rowinsky v. Bryan In-
dependent School District.as First, Part II summarizes the facts of Rowinsky. 19
Next, Part III discusses the development of sexual harassment case law,
considers the definition of sexual harassment and addresses workplace
sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (Tide VII)'.20
Part III also focuses on peer sexual harassment under Title IX of the Edu-
cation Amendments Act and discusses state statutes directed at sexual har-
assment in schools. 2 1 Then, Parts IV and V focus on the analysis of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Rowinsky, conclud-
ing that the Fifth Circuit's decision not to impose Tite IX liability on the
school district was appropriate, although inadequate in addressing this is-
sue. 22 Part V also discusses what schools can do in response to peer sexual
harassment.2 3 Finally, Part VI addresses the effect the Fifth Circuit's hold-
ing will have on future Title IX peer sexual harassment cases.
24
sis to analyze school liability for peer sexual harassment), and Bosley, 904 F. Supp.
at 1022-25 (applying Title VII analysis to determine school liability for peer hostile
environment sexual harassment).
Unlike the courts that advocate applying a Title VII analysis to Title IX peer
sexual harassment cases, the Rowinsky court reached its decision through a statu-
tory analysis of Title IX and concluded that Title IX's intent, purpose and promul-
gated regulations do not favor holding school districts liable for actions of third
parties other than the district's agents. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1006. For a discus-
sion of the Rowinsky court's analysis, see infra notes 163-201 and accompanying
text.
18. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996). This Note fo-
cuses on peer sexual harassment in elementary and secondary schools. Although
colleges and universities are subject to Title IX, peer sexual harassment in higher
education calls for different considerations and is beyond the scope of this article.
For a discussion of peer sexual harassment on college campuses, see BILLIE W.
DZIECH & LINDA WEINER, THE LECHEROUS PROFESSOR: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAM-
Pus (1984); IVORY POWER: SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS (Michele A. Paludi ed.
1990); Faber, supra note 6; Ronna G. Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Edu-
cation, 65 TEX. L. REv. 525 (1987).
19. For an account of the facts in Rowinsky, see infra notes 25-55 and accompa-
nying text.
20. For a discussion of the meaning of sexual harassment, see infra notes 56-
64 and accompanying text. For a discussion of sexual harassment case law under
Title VII, see infra notes 65-95 and accompanying text.
21. For further discussion of peer sexual harassment cases under Title IX, see
infra notes 96-142 and accompanying text. For a detailed discussion of state ac-
tions regarding sexual harassment in schools, see infra notes 143-162 and accompa-
nying text.
22. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's holding, see infra notes 163-216 and
accompanying text.
23. For a further discussion of how schools can address peer sexual harass-
ment, see infra notes 217-226 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the impact of Rowinsky, see infra notes 227-230 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 42: p. 969
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss3/5
II. ROtWNSKY V. BRYAN INDFPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
Jane and Janet Doe were eighth graders at Sam Rayburn Middle
School in the Bryan Independent School District ("BISD") in Texas dur-
ing the 1992-93 school year.2 5 Jane and Janet rode the BISD bus to and
from school.26 Boys and girls were required to sit on different sides of the
bus.27 In September, a male student, G.S., began to physically and ver-
bally abuse Janet on the bus.2 8 G.S. regularly swatted Janet's bottom when
she walked down the aisle of the bus.2 9 He directed comments to her such
as "[w]hat bra size are you wearing" and called her a "whore."30 Janet
reported the incidents to the bus driver eight times.3 1 G.S., however, con-
tinued the sexual harassment.3 2
Jane, Janet and their parents also complained about the incidents to
Assistant Principal Randy Caperton.3 3 As a result of the Rowinskys' com-
plaint, Caperton suspended G.S. from riding the bus for three days and
required him to sit in the second row behind the driver.3 4 The suspen-
sion, however, did not deter G.S. and he violated the seating require-
ment.3 5 Mrs. Rowinsky then called Jay Anding, Assistant Director of the
district's transportation office, demanding that he restrict G.S. to the sec-
ond row seat on the bus.3 6 Meanwhile, Jane and Janet were subjected to
25. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1008 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996). Debra Rowinsky sued as next of friend for her minor
children who are referred to in this case under the pseudonyms of Jane and Janet
Doe. See id. at 1006, 1009.
26. See id. at 1008.
27. See id.
28. See id. The court identifies the student harassers only by their initials. See
id.
29. See id.
30. See id. Other comments included "[w]hat size panties are you wearing"
and "[w]hen are you going to let me f- you." See id.
31. See id. The bus driver merely jotted down the harasser's name on paper.
Eventually, Janet stopped reporting the incidents. See id.
32. See id. In one instance, G.S. grabbed Jane's genital area and her breasts.
See id.
33. See id. Caperton told the Rowinskys that he already heard about the as-
sault from another student and that he believed the nature of the assault war-
ranted expulsion. See id. The Rowinsky family also filed sexual assault charges
against G.S. with the Bryan City police. See id. at 1008 n.2.
34. See id. at 1008. A week after meeting with Caperton to complain about the
incidents, Mrs. Rowinsky returned to Caperton's office to complain about other
girls who were also being harassed on the bus. See id. Caperton showed Mrs.
Rowinsky a copy of the bus report documentingJane's incident. See id. The report
contained numerous inaccuracies such as the wrong date and length of punish-
ment. See id. Moreover, the report did not name the assailant. See id. Caperton
corrected the inaccuracies in a new report. See id.
35. See id. "[A]s a result, [the bus driver] restricted Jane and Janet to the
front of the bus." Id.
36. See id. at 1008-09. Anding also told Mrs. Rowinsky that he would discuss
the situation with the bus driver. See id. at 1009.
1997] NOTE
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continued sexual harassment on the bus.37 G.S. called the girls offensive
names and continued to slap Janet's bottom.38
Later in the year, another male student, L.H., started sexually harass-
ing Jane and Janet.3 9 L.H. reached up Jane's and Janet's skirts, made
crude remarks and grabbed Janet's genital area. 40 Again, Mrs. Rowinsky
reported the behavior to Anding and told him that other girls were also
sexually assaulted. 41 Anding stated he would investigate the problems and
take action. 42 Mrs. Rowinsky also contacted Dr. Tom Purifoy, BISD Direc-
tor of Secondary Education, to complain about the assaults. 43 Dr. Purifoy
referred her to C.W. Henry, Anding's assistant, who after investigating the
incidents assigned a new bus driver. 44 Despite the fact that G.S. made no
further assaults, Mrs. Rowinsky "removed her daughters from the bus" and
requested that Dr. Purifoy remove G.S. from the bus.45
The sexual harassment, however, did not end. 46 During class, an-
other student, F.F., "reached under Janet's shirt and unfastened her
bra."47 The teacher sent both Janet and F.F. to the Vice Principal's of-
fice. 4 8 The Vice Principal suspended F.F. for the rest of the day and the
next day. 49 Mrs. Rowinsky complained to the Vice Principal about F.F.'s
behavior and was told that F.F.'s conduct was not considered "to be
sexual."'50
In March, Mrs. Rowinsky, along with her attorney, met with Dr. Sarah
Ashburn, BISD Superintendent, to complain about the students' behav-
ior.5 1 Dr. Ashburn said the bus suspension was sufficient punishment and
37. See id.
38. See id. at 1009. The bus driver did nothing and the girls did not file any
further complaints. See id.
39. See id. Janet complained to the bus driver, but the driver did not do any-
thing. See id.
40. See id. Janet complained about the incidents to the bus driver, who "just
stared into space" and Jane did not complain about the incident. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. Mrs. Rowinsky later contacted Caperton to find out the results of
the investigation. See id. She was told that Anding did not conduct the investiga-
tion but that L.H. was suspended for three days. See id. After L.H.'s suspension, he
was not alleged to have further harassed the girls. See id. at 1009 n.3.
43. See id. at 1009.
44. See id. Henry assigned a new bus driver and the new driver assigned G.S.
to sit next to Jane. See id.
45. See id. Purifoy refused to take action against G.S. "without proof of the




49. See id. The Vice Principal sent Janet back to class. See id. "F.F. is not
alleged to have harassed or abused the girls further." Id.
50. See id.
51. See id. Dr. Ashburn also did not "inform [Mrs. Rowinsky] about the exist-
ence of [T]itle IX or any [T]itle IX grievance procedures [such as filing a com-
plaint with the Office of Civil Rights]." Id.
[Vol. 42: p. 969
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did not take any further action.5 2 Mrs. Rowinsky then filed suit under
Title IX against BISD for creating a hostile educational environment by
failing to take appropriate measures to stop the peer sexual harassment.
5 3
The district court held that Rowinsky failed to state a claim under
Title IX because she failed to provide evidence demonstrating that BISD
discriminated against the students based on sex.54 The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's judgment, holding that Title IX does not im-
pose liability on a school district for peer hostile environment sexual
harassment, if the school district itself did not discriminate based on sex.
55
52. See id. Mrs. Rowinsky returned to see Dr. Ashburn and complain about
her failure to punish G.S. and L.H. See id. Dr. Ashburn did not take further action
against L.H. because he was no longer a student at Bryan Independent School
District (BISD). See id.
53. See id. at 1009-10. The court concluded that Mrs. Rowinsky did not have
standing to assert a personal claim under Title IX. See id. at 1009 n.4. According
to the court, however, she did have standing to assert the claims of her daughters
as next of friend. See id. "The district court did not rule on the request for class
certification." Id. at 1009 n.5. The plaintiffs did not complain of that failure on
appeal. See id. The district court dismissed the claims against BISD officials, leav-
ing the school district as the only defendant. See id. at 1010 n.6.
Mrs. Rowinsky also told Dr. Ashburn that she intended to file a grievance with
the Department of Education, Office of Civil Rights (OCR) under Title IX. See id.
at 1009.
54. See id. at 1010. The complaint asserted that "BISD and its officials con-
doned and caused hostile environment sexual harassment." Id. Specifically, the
complaint stated that Janet was sexually harassed by a student at Sam Rayburn
Middle School and Jane and Janet were sexually harassed by students on the BISD
school bus. See id. Rowinsky sought declaratory and injunctive relief, along with
compensatory damages and attorney's fees under Title IX. See id.
In holding that Rowinsky failed to state a claim under Title IX, the district
court relied on a number of factors. See id. For example, it looked to see whether
boys who assaulted other boys were punished in the same manner as boys who
assaulted girls. See id. The district court found that because the incidents involved
different levels of physical conduct, any disparity between punishments was not
based on sex. See id. Furthermore, it concluded that the school district's failure to
properly train employees would harm both females and males equally. See id.
55. See id. at 1016. The Fifth Circuit noted that "a school district might violate
[T] ide IX if it treated sexual harassment of boys more seriously than sexual harass-
ment of girls, or even if it turned a blind eye toward sexual harassment of girls
while addressing assaults that harm boys." Id. The court concluded that the lan-
guage of Title IX does not extend liability to those other than grant recipients or
their agents. See id. Thus, a school district may be liable under Title IX only if it or
an agent of the school district discriminated against students based on sex. See id.
Rowinsky filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. Rowinsky v.
Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 U.S.L.W. 3033 (U.S. July 16, 1996) (No. 96-4). The
Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 7, 1996. Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep.
Sch. Dist., 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996); see Linda P. Campbell, Mother's Appeal Rejected:
High Court Won't Hear Girls' Harassment Case, FORT-WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, Oct. 8,
1996, at 1 ("The justices made no comment on the merits of Rowinsky's argu-
ment."); Lyle Denniston, High Court Refuses to Take Up Student Sexual Harassment
Case; As New Term Begins, Justices Opt to Stay Out of Growing Controversy, BALTIMORE
SUN, Oct. 8, 1996, at 3A (stating that effect of Supreme Court's decision is that
schools will have to look to their attorneys for advice on how to react to incidents
of harassment); Epstein, supra note 6, at A6 ("Rowinsky's case was turned away at a
9
Lu: Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District: Does Title IX Impo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
978 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42: p. 969
III. DEVELOPMENT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT CASE LAW
A. What Is Sexual Harassment?
A precise definition of sexual harassment is difficult to formulate be-
cause the term encompasses many types of behavior. 56 Despite the lack of
a uniform definition, the basis of sexual harassment entails "'unwelcome
conduct' of a sexual nature" by a person in a position of power over the
victim. 57 This basis originates from the Equal Employment Opportunity
time when the nation's school districts are beset by cases of sexual harassment, and
judges are divided over whether negligent districts may be forced to pay damages
under federal law."); Frank J. Murray, High Court Limits Harassment Cases Man-to-
Man, Child-to-Child Claims Rejected, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1996, at A3 (stating that
Supreme Court's refusal to hear Rowinsky case means harassment by fellow stu-
dents does not "trigger federal civil rights laws"); Judy Wiessler & Teri Bailey, High
Court Won't Hear Texas Case: Bryan Schools Not Liable in Sex Harassment Suit, HOUSTON
CHRON., Oct. 8, 1996, at 1 (discussing Rowinsky case and Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari).
56. See Rinestine, supra note 6, at 804"05; see also CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEX-
UAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 27 (1979) (arguing that traditionally women
would not complain of sexual harassment because of lack of definition for such
behavior); Schneider, supra note 18, at 533 (stating that sexual harassment can
include verbal innuendos); Sherer, supra note 6, at 2125 (stating that there is no
"clear, concise, widely accepted definition of [sexual harassment]").
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidelines, recog-
nizing sexual harassment as a type of discrimination prohibited under Title VII,
define sexual harassment in the workplace as:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature ... when (1) submission to such
conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct
by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unrea-
sonably interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1997).
In a 1981 policy memorandum, the Department of Education's OCR defined
sexual harassment as "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, imposed on
the basis of sex, by an employee or agent of a recipient that denies, limits, provides
different, or conditions the provisions of aid, benefits, services or treatment pro-
tected under Title IX." Sherer, supra note 6, at 2126 (citing OFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IT'S NOT ACADEMIC 2 (1986)).
57. Rinestine, supra note 6, at 805; see also MACKINNON, supra note 56, at 1
(describing sexual harassment as imposing sexual requirements "in the context of
a relationship of unequal power"); Jolynn Childers, Note, Is There a Place for a Rea-
sonable Woman in the Law? A Discussion of Recent Developments in Hostile Environment
Sexual Harassment, 42 DUKE L.J. 854, 870 (1993) (stating that sexual harassment is
issue of power rather than issue about sex); Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abu-
sive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1449, 1451 (1984) (describ-
ing sexual harassment as "abuse of power that discriminates against members of a
discrete and vulnerable group") [hereinafter Note, Abusive Work Environment].
The Fifth Circuit in Rowinsky addressed this issue of power in a lengthy foot-
note. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1011 n.ll. The court stated that in an educational
context, a power relationship exists between the educational institution and the
student. See id. In contrast, no power relationship exists between two students,
and the respondeat superior theory has neither logical nor precedential support.
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Commission (EEOC) guidelines on sexual harassment in the workplace. 58
The EEOC guidelines state that sexual harassment violates Title VII if ac-
quiescence to such conduct becomes a condition of one's employment or
determines employee advancement or such conduct creates a hostile
working environment. 59 In determining whether the conduct amounts to
sexual harassment, the EEOC uses the "totality of the circumstances"
test.
60
Courts have generally recognized two types of sexual harassment:
quid pro quo and hostile environment. 61 Quid pro quo harassment oc-
curs when a person in a position of power conditions receipt of tangible
benefits upon performance of sexual favors from the subordinate or pun-
ishes the subordinate for not complying with such conditions.62 Hostile
environment sexual harassment occurs when the conduct of the harasser
See id. Therefore, sexual advances between students do not have the same "coer-
cive effect or abuse of power as those made by a teacher, employer or co-worker."
Id. In peer sexual harassment a key ingredient is missing: a "power relationship
between the harasser and the victim." Id.
58. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a). Since the issuance of the EEOC guidelines,
the Supreme Court has used that definition in holding that hostile environment
sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII. The Court stated "these Guide-
lines, 'while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do consti-
tute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants
may properly resort for guidance.'" Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65
(1986) (citing General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)).
59. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
60. Id. § 1604.11(b). Some factors the EEOC will look at include the nature
of the sexual advances and the context in which such conduct occurred. See id.
"The determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from the
facts, on a case by case basis." Id.
61. See Sherer, supra note 6, at 2126. See, e.g., Meitor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at
57 (describing quid pro quo harassment as conditioning of "employment benefits
on sexual favors"); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993) (discussing
severe or pervasive aspect of hostile environment sexual harassment); Winsor v.
Hinckley Dodge, Inc., 79 F.3d 996, 1000 (10th Cir. 1996) (recognizing quid pro
quo and hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII); Tomka v. Seiler
Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1304-05 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing standard for hostile work
environment sexual harassment); Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1395 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (discussing quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment in
workplace); Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466, 473 (8th Cir. 1995) (set-
ting out elements for quid pro quo sexual harassment); Fuller v. City of Oakland,
Cal., 47 F.3d 1522, 1522 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding city liable for hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment under Title VII); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 508-09
(9th Cir. 1994) (finding quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual
harassment).
62. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 65 (discussing Title VII guidelines
about economic quid pro quo); Winsor, 79 F.3d at 1000 (recognizing quid pro quo
and hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII); Gary, 59 F.3d at 1395
(discussing quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment in work-
place); Cram, 49 F.3d at 473 (setting out elements for quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment); Nichols, 42 F.3d at 508-09 (finding quid pro quo and hostile environment
sexual harassment); Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 1977)
(alleging that academic advancement was based on compliance with professor's
sexual demands); Rinestine, supra note 6, at 806 (stating that "quid pro quo harass-
11
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is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of the victim's]
employment and create an abusive working environment.' 63  The
Supreme Court has held that both types of harassment violate Title VII. 6 4
B. Workplace Sexual Harassment Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
Sexual harassment was first recognized as a form of sex discrimination
in the workplace. 65 As numerous workplace sexual harassment claims are
filed under Title VII, courts have engaged in the process of creating and
refining the standards for proving such a case. 6 6 Congress enacted Title
ment is uniformly accepted as cause of action under Title IX"); Sherer, supra note
6, at 2126 (illustrating example of quid pro quo harassment).
63. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 67. In Meritor Savings Bank, the Supreme
Court recognized sexual harassment as actionable under the hostile environment
theory. See id. Michelle Vinson brought an action against Sidney Taylor, manager
of one of Meritor Savings Bank branch offices, under Title VII. See id. at 60. Vin-
son claimed that during the four years she worked at the bank, Taylor "made re-
peated demands upon her for sexual favors." Id. Furthermore, Vinson claimed
that Taylor "fondled her in front of other employees, followed her into the wo-
men's restroom when she went there alone, exposed himself to her, and even for-
cibly raped her on several occasions." Id. The district court concluded that Vinson
did not prove a violation of Title VII. See id. at 62. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed and held that a Title VII
claim may be predicated upon quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual har-
assment. See id. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision, recog-
nizing an actionable claim under the hostile environment theory. See id. at 64; see
also Winsor, 79 F.3d at 1000 (recognizing quid pro quo and hostile environment
sexual harassment under Title VII); Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1304-05 (discussing standard
for hostile work environment sexual harassment); Gary, 59 F.3d at 1395 (discussing
quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment in workplace); Cram, 49
F.3d at 473 (setting out elements for quid pro quo sexual harassment); Fuller, 47
F.3d at 1522 (holding city liable for hostile environment sexual harassment under
Title VII); Nichols, 42 F.3d at 508-09 (finding quid pro quo and hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment); Rinestine, supra note 6, at 807 (defining hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment); Sherer, supra note 6, at 2126 (same); Note, Abusive
Working Environment, supra note 57, at 1455 (discussing hostile working environ-
ment claims under Title VII).
64. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 64-65 (stating that actions under Title
VII are not limited to quid pro quo harassment, but also include hostile environ-
ment theory); Winsor, 79 F.3d at 1000 (recognizing quid pro quo and hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment under Title VII); Gary, 59 F.3d at 1395 (discussing
quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment in workplace); Nichols,
42 F.3d at 508-09 (finding quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual
harassment).
65. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 64-65 (recognizing quid pro quo and
hostile environment sexual harassment as actionable claims under Title VII sex
discrimination prohibition); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415,
1425-26 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (stating sexual harassment is "major problem in the
workplace" (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991))). "Forms of sex-
ual harassment in the workplace fall along a continuum from unsolicited flirtation
to coerced sexual relations." Note, Abusive Work Environment, supra note 57, at
1451.
66. See, e.g., Hirras v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 95 F.3d 396, 399 (5th Cir.
1996) (setting out elements required for workplace sexual harassment claim under
Title VII); Winsor, 79 F.3d at 1000 ("Sexual harassment under Title VII can be
[Vol. 42: p. 969
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VII to prohibit discrimination in the workplace based on sex, race, color,
religion and national origin.6 7 Although Title VII does not expressly ad-
dress sexual harassment, the EEOC and courts have recognized sexual har-
assment as a legitimate cause of action under Title VII.
68
shown under one of two principal theories: quid pro quo discrimination or hostile
work environment."); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir.
1996) (finding that sexual harassment was not sufficiently severe and, thus, did not
satisfy Tide VII's severe and pervasive conduct test under hostile environment the-
ory); Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1304-05 (discussing standard for Tide VII hostile work envi-
ronment sexual harassment);Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 719-20 (5th Cir.
1986) (same); Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-56 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that
sexual harassment violates Tide VII if condoned or carried out by supervisory
personnel).
Two common theories for proving a Title VII violation are the disparate treat-
ment theory and the disparate impact theory. See Petaluma City, 949 F. Supp. at
1423. Disparate treatment occurs when a person is treated less favorably because
of that person's membership in a group protected under Title VII. See id. To
prove disparate treatment, the plaintiff must prove that he or she belongs to a
protected group under Tide VII and was denied employment benefits because of
his or her membership in the group. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) (discussing disparate treatment and dispa-
rate impact theories); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973) (setting out test for disparate treatment claim); Note, Abusive Working Envi-
ronment, supra note 57, at 1454-55 (discussing McDonnell Douglas disparate treat-
ment theory in context of workplace sexual harassment). Under a disparate
impact theory, the plaintiff need not prove intentional discrimination on the part
of the defendant. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15. Rather, disparate impact
occurs when a facially neutral practice adversely affects members of a protected
group to a greater degree than others. See id.; see also Note, Abusive Working Envi-
ronment, supra note 57, at 1455-56 (discussing disparate impact theory in context of
hostile environment sexual harassment).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). Title VII states in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail
or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges or employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a) (1).
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 amended Tide VII to allow harassment victims to
recover compensatory and punitive damages from their employer under Tide VII.
See Miller, supra note 6, at 705 (discussing cause of action under Title VII); Note,
Abusive Working Environment, supra note 57, at 1451-53 (discussing theoretical
frame work for claim of sexual harassment in workplace).
68. See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 655 (D.D.C. 1976) (asserting that
dismissal for noncompliance with sexual demands "constitutes sex discrimination
within the definitional parameters of Title VII"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom.
Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, 477
U.S. at 62-69 (recognizing hostile environment sexual harassment as actionable
claim under Title VII); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.
1982) (stating that sexual harassment is actionable if "sufficiently pervasive so as to
alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment");
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that claim for viola-
tion of Title VII may be predicated upon quid pro quo harassment and hostile
environment harassment); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238-39 (5th Cir. 1971)
(recognizing claim of racial hostile work environment as actionable under Title
VII).
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The EEOC promulgated guidelines to define sexual harassment.69
The EEOC guidelines list the types of conduct that may be actionable and
three forms of conduct that constitute sexual harassment in violation of
Title VII. 70 First, the types of conduct include unwelcome sexual ad-
vances, requests for sexual favors, or verbal or physical contacts of a sexual
nature.71 Second, such conduct constitutes sexual harassment if it creates
(1) a condition upon one's employment, quid pro quo; (2) an offensive,
intimidating or hostile work environment; or (3) becomes the basis of em-
ployment decisions with respect to employee advancement. 72 Although
the guidelines do not have the force of law, the courts refer to them for
guidance in determining what constitutes sexual harassment under Title
VII.73 In the landmark case of Mefitor Savings Bank v. Vinson,74 the
Supreme Court expressly recognized both quid pro quo and hostile envi-
69. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1997). The guidelines state in part:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of section 703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employ-
ment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has the pur-
pose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment.
Id.
70. See id. The EEOC guidelines further state that under general Title VII
principles, employers are liable for their own acts and those of their agents. See id.
§ 1604.11 (c).
An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with
respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the
employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have
known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate cor-
rective action. In reviewing these cases the Commission will consider the
extent of the employer's control and any other legal responsibility which
the employer may have with respect to the conduct of such non-
employees.
Id. § 1604.11(e).
71. Id. § 1604.11(a). For the actual text of 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a), see supra
note 69.
72. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a). For the actual text of 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a), see
supra note 69.
73. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). The Supreme
Court expressly stated that as an "'administrative interpretation of the Act by the
enforcing agency' [the guidelines] 'while not controlling upon the courts by rea-
son of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment
to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.'" Id. (citing Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) and General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)).
74. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
[Vol. 42: p. 969
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 3 [1997], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol42/iss3/5
ronment sexual harassment as legitimate causes of action under Title
V1I. 7
5
In Meritor Savings Bank, the plaintiff alleged that her employer's
harassing conduct created an offensive and intimidating work environ-
ment.76 In finding that quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual har-
assment are actionable claims under Title VII, the Supreme Court
concluded that Title VII is not limited to "economic" or "tangible" dis-
crimination. 77 Rather, the Court determined that Title VII manifests a
congressional intent to address the whole array of disparate treatment of
men and women in the phrase "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any individual with
75. See id. at 62-63, 73 (finding no limiting language in Title VII). The first
case regarding quid pro quo harassment was Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654,
657 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240
(D.C. Cir. 1978). In Williams, the court held that an employer's retaliatory firing
based on the employee's refusal to comply with sexual demands constitutes sex
discrimination under Title VII. See id. A claim for a racially hostile work environ-
ment was first recognized in Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971). In Rog-
ers, the employer allegedly created an offensive work environment when Hispanic
clients were discriminatorily treated. See id. at 239. The Fifth Circuit held that this
type of treatment threatens the "emotional and psychological stability of minority
group workers" and created an unlawful work environment under Title VII. See id.
at 238. Subsequently, the hostile environment theory has been applied to harass-
ment based on race, religion and national origin. See, e.g., Cariddi v. Kansas City
Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977) (rejecting Title VII claim for
discrimination based on national origin because ethnic slurs did not rise to level of
Title VII violation); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (holding that Title VII arguably grants employee fight to "a working envi-
ronment free of racial intimidation" pursuant to EEOC guidelines); Compston v.
Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 161-62 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (awarding nominal dam-
ages where plaintiff proved Title VII workplace hostile environment harassment on
basis of religious faith and ancestry).
76. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 60. The sexual harassment continued
throughout the plaintiffs four-year employment with the bank. See id. The har-
asser, a Vice President of the bank and one of its branch managers, invited the
plaintiff to dinner shortly after her probationary period. See id. at 59-60. After
dinner, he suggested they go to a motel and engage in sexual relations. See id. at
60. Plaintiff at first refused the offer, but out of "fear of losing her job she eventu-
ally agreed." Id. Thereafter, he repeatedly demanded sexual favors. See id. These
demands occurred at the branch office during and after business hours. See id.
The plaintiff sought injunctive relief, compensatory and punitive damages and
attorney's fees. See id. at 61. The district court held that the plaintiff was not a
victim of sex discrimination nor of sexual harassment under Title VII during her
employment at the bank. See id. The district court further concluded that the
bank was not liable for any violations because it was without notice. See id. at 62.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
referring to the EEOC guidelines, stated that an actionable claim under Title VII
"may be predicated on either of two types of sexual harassment: harassment that
involves the conditioning of concrete employment benefits on sexual favors, and
harassment that, while not affecting economic benefits, creates a hostile or offen-
sive working environment." Id. at 62. The court of appeals further held that the
bank was absolutely liable for the conduct of its agents or supervisors with respect
to sexual harassment. See id. at 63.
77. See id. at 64.
1997] NOTE 983
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respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment. "78 In further support of its conclusion, the Court stated that the
EEOC considers sexual harassment a form of sex discrimination under
Title VII. 79 Moreover, the Court recognized hostile environment sexual
harassment as violating Tide VII and stated that sexual harassment is ac-
tionable if it severely or pervasively alters the conditions of the victim's
employment and creates an offensive work environment.80 Finally, the
Court cautioned that not all incidents of a sexual nature constitute a hos-
tile work environment under Title VII, but only those that are sufficiently
severe or pervasive. 81
The Meritor Savings Bank decision left several questions unanswered,
such as what types of conduct would sufficiently alter the employment con-
dition to create a hostile environment.8 2 The Supreme Court attempted
78. Id. (citing City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). The Court further stated that the defendant bank did
not produce evidence to suggest a congressional intent to limit Title VII to "eco-
nomic" or "tangible" discrimination. See id.
79. See id. at 65. The EEOC guidelines expressly recognize sexual harassment
as a violation of section 703 of Title VII if submission to unwelcome sexual ad-
vances is a condition to employment, forms a basis for employee advancement or
creates an offensive, hostile work environment. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a) (1997).
For a more detailed examination of the EEOC guideline, see supra notes 69-71 and
accompanying text.
80. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 66-67. The Meritor Savings Bank Court
concluded that nothing in Title VII suggests that hostile environment sexual har-
assment should not be prohibited. See id. at 66. The Court reached its conclusion
by relying on the EEOC guidelines and precedent. See id. The EEOC guidelines
state that certain kinds of conduct constitute sexual harassment if, inter alia, such
conduct creates an intimidating, offensive or hostile working environment. See 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(a). Numerous courts had endorsed this interpretation prior to
the Meritor Savings Bank decision. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254-55 (4th
Cir. 1983) (recognizing two basic types of sexual harassment: quid pro quo and
hostile environment); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1lth Cir.
1982) ("Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for
members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the work-
place that racial harassment is to racial equality."); Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d 934,
947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (acknowledging that sexual harassment in work environment
constitutes sex discrimination); Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238-39 (recognizing cause of
action under discriminatory work environment theory); Zabkowicz v. West Bend
Co., 589 F. Supp. 780, 783-85 (E.D. Wis. 1984) (holding employer liable for failing
to take appropriate measures to stop sexually hostile environment created by em-
ployees), affd in part, rev'd in part, 789 F.2d 540 (7th Cir. 1986).
81. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 (citing Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238).
The Rogers court warned that "mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which
engenders offensive feelings in an employee" does not create a hostile work envi-
ronment actionable under Title VII. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238. Rather, the Supreme
Court has stated that the conduct must be severe or pervasive. See Meritor Savings
Bank, 477 U.S. at 67. Yet, it does not need to cause psychological harm to be
actionable under Title VII. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22
(1993).
82. See Rinestine, supra note 6, at 809.
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to address this issue in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.83 The Harris Court
held that "severe or pervasive conduct" is conduct that a reasonable per-
son perceives as creating a hostile environment. 84 In addition, the victim
must also subjectively perceive the environment as hostile.8 5 The Court
further stated that severe or pervasive conduct need not affect a plaintiff's
psychological well-being or cause the plaintiff to suffer tangible or physical
injury.86 Rather, "Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct
leads to a nervous breakdown." 87 The Court concluded that to determine
whether an environment is hostile requires examination of all the factors,
such as frequency and severity of the conduct.88 Following the holdings in
Meritor Savings Bank and Harris, courts have developed a three-prong test
for analyzing workplace hostile environment sexual harassment claims
under Title VII. The plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she was
subjected to sexual advances, requests for sexual favors or other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature; (2) the conduct was unwelcome; and
(3) the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment. 89
83. 510 U.S. 17 (1993). In Harris, the plaintiff alleged that the president of
the defendant company, her former employer, constantly insulted her because of
her gender and directed unwanted sexual innuendos at her. Id. at 19. The presi-
dent called the plaintiff "a dumb a- woman".and said "[y] ou're a woman, what do
you know" in front of other employees. Id. He regularly asked plaintiff to retrieve
coins from his pocket and made sexual innuendos about plaintiffs clothing. See id.
84. See id. at 21. At least one court advocates the use of a reasonable woman
standard rather than just a reasonable person standard. See Ellison v. Brady, 924
F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991) (concluding that focus should be on perspective of
victim in evaluating severity and pervasiveness of sexual harassment under Title
VII). This court concluded that a sex-blind reasonable person standard is male-
biased and does not account for the common concerns many women share that
men do not necessarily share. See id. at 879. The court further stated that to ana-
lyze sexual harassment under a reasonable person standard would run the risk of
"reinforcing the prevailing level of discrimination. Harassers could continue to
harass merely because a particular discriminatory practice was common, and vic-
tims of harassment would have no remedy." Id. at 878. Thus, applying a gender-
conscious analysis of sexual harassment would "enable[ ] women to participate in
the workplace on an equal footing with men." Id. at 879.
85. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
86. See id. at 22. Psychological harm is a relevant factor that may be taken into
account; however, no single factor is required for conduct to satisfy the severe and
pervasive test. See id. at 23. Other factors to account for are frequency of the al-
leged conduct, its severity, its threatening or humiliating nature and its interfer-
ence with the victim's work performance. See id.
87. Id. at 22. The Court also concluded that a hostile work environment,
although it may not affect the plaintiffs' psychological well-being, can and will af-
fect the plaintiffs' job performance, discourage them from remaining at the job
and keep them from advancing in their professions. See id.
88. See id. at 23. For a discussion of relevant factors considered in determin-
ing when hostile environment exists, see supra note 86.
89. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 65-67 (holding that it was sufficient for
plaintiff to claim Tide VII discrimination based on sex if plaintiff demonstrated
that she was subject to unwelcome sexual conduct that was severe or pervasive
enough to create abusive work environment); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d
1997] NOTE
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Courts have also used similar standards to analyze employer liability
under Title VII.90 Before Meritor Savings Bank, courts had held employers
liable for any Title VII violation under the theory of respondeat supe-
rior.91 Thus, an employer would be liable for a Title VII violation if the
employee, acting in the course of his or her employment, discriminated
against another in violation of Title VII. 92 Presently, courts apply a three-
prong analysis to determine employer liability in Title VII hostile work
environment sexual harassment claims: (1) the plaintiff must be subject
to unwelcome sexual harassment based on their gender; (2) the conduct
must be sufficiently pervasive or severe to create an abusive work environ-
ment; and (3) the employer must know or be on notice of the hostile
environment and fail to take remedial action.93 Even though employers
may be liable under Title VII for an employee's harassing conduct, no
definitive rule exists for employer liability; rather, the Supreme Court has
stated that it wanted courts to look to agency principles for guidance in
1504, 1514-15 (9th Cir. 1989) (delineating elements for Title VII hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claim as derived from Meritor Savings Bank decision); Jor-
dan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1373 (9th Cir. 1988) (same).
90. SeeAndrade v. Mayfair Management, Inc., 88 F.3d 258, 261 (4th Cir. 1996)
(stating that employer is liable for hostile environment sexual harassment under
Title VII if "employer knew or should have known of illegal conduct and failed to
take prompt and adequate remedial action"); Fleenor v. Hewitt Soap Co., 81 F.3d
48, 49 (6th Cir.) (restating and applying elements for employer liability under Ti-
tle VII), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 170 (1996); Fuller v. City of Oakland, Cal., 47 F.3d
1522, 1525 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding city liable under Title VII for hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment); Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 508-09 (9th Cir. 1994)
(finding employer liable under respondeat superior theory for quid pro quo and
hostile environment sexual harassment); see also, Ming K Ayvas, Note, The Circuit
Split on Title VII Personal Supervisor Liability, 23 FoRDrHAM URB. L.J. 797, 805-08
(1996) (discussing employer liability under Title VII).
91. See Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating
that there is nothing in Title VII's legislative history to support congressional in-
tent that employer should not be liable if one of its "employees, acting in the
course of his employment, commits the tort" and that "[s]uch a rule would create
an enormous loophole in the statute[ 1"); Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552
F.2d 1277, 1282 (7th Cir. 1977) (concluding that employer "defendant is liable as
principal for any violation of Title VII" by employee in employee's capacity as
supervisor).
92. See Miller, 600 F.2d at 213 (stating that respondeat superior rule, under
which employer is liable for torts of its employees acting in course of their employ-
ment, is "just as appropriate [in a Title VII sexual harassment case]" when actor is
supervisor of wronged employee). The Miller court further stated that such a rule
would not be a burden on an employer because an "employer whose internal pro-
cedures would have redressed the alleged discrimination can avoid litigation by
employing those procedures to remedy the discrimination upon receiving notice
of the complaint or during the conciliation period." Id. at 214.
93. See Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d at 1515-16 (discussing prevailing trend in case
law that "employers are liable for failing to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive
work environment of which management-level employees knew, or in the exercise
of reasonable care should have known" (citing Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d
1010, 1015 (8th Cir. 1988))); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415,
1423 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (discussing Title VII hostile work environment sexual har-
assment standard for employer liability that courts have developed).
986
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this area.9 4 Some courts have imported the Title VII employer liability
framework into cases involving school district liability for peer sexual har-
assment under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act.95
C. Peer Sexual Harassment Under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act
Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in any federally funded educa-
tion program or activity. 96 Specifically, Title IX states that no person, on
the basis of sex, shall be excluded from participation in, denied the bene-
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any federally funded edu-
cation program or activity.
97
Congress enacted Title IX to accomplish two related, but distinct,
objectives.98 First, Congress endeavored to prevent the use of federal
94. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 72 (declining to issue definitive rule
on employer liability and directing courts to refer to agency principles when ana-
lyzing this issue). This is not a strict liability standard because employers are given
an "opportunity to take reasonably adequate and effective action" before they can
be held liable for failing to do so. Davis v. McNea, No. 96-5272, 1997 WL 123745,
at *4 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 1997).
The EEOC guidelines state that "[w]ith respect to conduct between fellow
employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the work-
place where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) knows or
should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and
appropriate corrective action." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1997).
95. See, e.g., Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162,
169-70 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that Title VII legal standards apply to Tide IX
claims, although Title VII jurisprudence is only guide and courts should not
blindly apply Title VII to determine Title IX issues, but rather should determine
proper extent to which Title VII applies); Petaluma City, 949 F. Supp. at 1421-27
(applying Title VII analysis to Title IX peer hostile environment sexual harassment
case).
96. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1994). The pertinent part of Title IX states that
"[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
97. See id. Title IX defines "educational institution" as "any public or private
preschool, elementary, or secondary school, or any institution of vocational, pro-
fessional, or higher education." Id. § 1681(c). Title IX also exempts certain enti-
ties, such as boys and girls scouts. See id. § 1681 (a) (3) (exempting religious
institutions); § 1681 (a) (5) (exempting traditional single sex colleges);
§ 1681(a) (7) (exempting Girls State and Boys State programs); § 1681(a) (9) (ex-
empting higher education scholarship awards in beauty pageants).
98. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1012 n.14 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996) (stating Congress modeled Title IX after Title VI
and used identical language). Title VI states in part that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1994). The Supreme Court held that Title VI is spending-power legisla-
tion rather than a regulatory measure. See Guardian Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
463 U.S. 582, 599 (1983) ("Tide VI rests on the principle that 'taxpayers money,
which is collected without discrimination, shall be spent without discrimination."')
(quoting 110 CONG. REc. 7064 (1964) (comments of Senator Ribicoff)). The fact
that Title IX is modeled after Title VI suggests that Title IX is also a spending-
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funds to support discriminatory practices.99 Second, Congress sought to
protect individual citizens against discriminatory practices.' 0 0 The federal
departments and agencies that extend financial assistance to educational
programs and activities are responsible for enforcement of Title IX.1°1
The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) in the Department of Education is such
an agency and has promulgated regulations to enforce Title IX. 1 02 The
power legislation. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1012; see also Grove City College v. Bell, 465
U.S. 555, 577 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (stating purpose of Title IX is to
make "'discrimination' by recipients" of federal aid unlawful); Cannon v. Univer-
sity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979) (comparing Title IX objectives to its
model Title VI); Kelly S. Terry, Note, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools:
Reviving the Presumption of Remedies Under Implied Rights of Action, 46 ARK. L. REv.
715, 733-34 (1993) (stating that Title IX is patterned after Title VI and shares same
objective of prohibiting discrimination by institutions receiving federal aid).
Courts look to case law interpreting Title VII, rather than Title VI, to analyze
Title IX claims because Title VII has generated more discrimination case law than
Title VI. See Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 169-70 (using Title VII analysis in Title IX
peer hostile environment sexual harassment claim against school district); Burrow
v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1204 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (con-
cluding that Title VII precedent is appropriate analysis for peer hostile environ-
ment sexual harassment claim under Title IX).
99. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704. The principle education assistance bill in the
Senate at that time did not contain a sex discrimination prohibition clause. See
OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL, REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION: DISPARATE IMPACT AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZA-
TION OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 119 (1987) (discussing draft of bill in Senate)
[hereinafter REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION]. Senator Bayh, who introduced the
amendment, stated that the amendment's purpose was to "wipe aside some of the
discrimination that exists today, intentionally or unintentionally." Id. (citing 117
CONG. REc. 30404 (1971)). See Grove City College, 465 U.S. at 557 (Powell, J., con-
curring) (stating purpose of statute is to make "unlawful 'discrimination' by recipi-
ents of federal assistance"). In the past, courts cited the legislative sponsor's
remarks as an authoritative guide to the statutory construction. See North Haven
Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982) ("Senator Bayh's remarks, as those
of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted, are an authoritative guide to
the statute's construction."); Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426
U.S. 548, 564 (1976) (according statements by legislative sponsor "substantial
weight").
100. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704. Senator Bayh commented that "'[Title IX]
is a strong and comprehensive measure which.., is needed.., to provide women
with solid legal protection as they seek education and training for later careers
.... 1. Id. at 704 n.36 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 5806-07 (1972)). Representative
Mink stated that institutions that discriminate based on sex "'should not be asking
the taxpayers of this country to pay for this kind of discrimination."' Id. (quoting
117 CONG. REC. 39252 (1971)).
101. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994). Section 1682 states in pertinent part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Fed-
eral financial assistance to any education program or activity, by way of
grant, [or] loan .... is authorized and directed to effectuate the provi-
sions of section 1681 of this title .. .by issuing rules, regulations, or or-
ders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement
of the objectives of the statute ....
Id.
102. 34 C.F.R. § 106.31 (1997) (setting out regulations OCR promulgated re-
garding Title IX). One of the implementing regulations states in part: "(b) Specific
988 [Vol. 42: p. 969
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OCR also has the power to impose sanctions upon recipients who fail to
comply with Title IX requirements.
10 3
The OCR may, after a hearing, terminate the grant or refuse to grant
assistance to recipients who violate the statute. 10 4 The Supreme Court ac-
prohibitions. Except as provided in this subpart, in providing any aid, benefit, or
service to a student, a recipient shall not, on the basis of sex: ... (7) Otherwise limit
any person in the enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity."
Id. § 106.31(b) (7) (emphasis added).
The Department of Health and Human Services also promulgated regulations
on Title IX. See 45 C.F.R. § 86.31 (1997) (setting out regulations that Department
of Health and Human Services promulgated regarding Title IX). The two sets of
regulations, though distinct, have minor similarities. For example, both state that
the recipient shall not "limit any person in the enjoyment of any right, privilege,
advantage, or opportunity." Id. § 86.31(b)(8); 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(b)(7) (1997).
In a Policy Memorandum, OCR stated that "[s]exual harassment consists of
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature, imposed on the basis of sex, by an
employee or agent of the recipient, that denies, limits, provides different, or conditions
the provision of aid, benefits, services or treatment protected under title IX." OCR
Policy Memorandum from Antonio J. Califa, Director of Litigation, Enforcement,
and Policy Service to Regional Civil Rights Directors (Aug. 31, 1981) (emphasis
added), cited in Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1015. The memorandum continues by stating
that "[t]he other unresolved issue relates to a recipient's responsibility for the sex-
ual harassment acts of students against fellow students in the context of the situa-
tion in which neither student is in a position of authority, derived from the
institution, over the other students." Id.
Recently, however, OCR promulgated under notice and comment a policy
guidance for educational institutions on sexual harassment of students by school
employees, other students or third parties. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harass-
ment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed.
Reg. 12034 (1997) [hereinafter Sexual Harassment Guidance]. In this policy gui-
dance, OCR expressly states that schools will be liable under Title IX for peer
sexual harassment if " (i) a hostile environment exists in the school's programs or
activities, (ii) the school knows or should have known of the harassment and (iii)
the school fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action." Id. at 12039.
OCR further states that the Rowinsky decision misinterprets Title IX. Id. at 12048
n.27. The policy guidance states that:
Title IX does not make a school responsible for the actions of the harass-
ing student, but rather for its own discrimination in failing to take imme-
diate and appropriate steps to remedy the hostile environment once a
school official knows about it. If a student is sexually harassed by a fellow
student, and a school official knows about it, but does not stop it, the
school is permitting an atmosphere of sexual discrimination to permeate
the educational program. The school is liable for its own action, or lack
of action, in response to this discrimination.
Id. Yet, despite OCR's belief that the Fifth Circuit misinterpreted Title IX, the
policy guidance states that OCR will comply with the Rowinsky holding when it
investigates complaints involving schools in the states located in the Fifth Circuit.
See id. The policy guidance further concludes that schools in those states, however,
are not prohibited from following OCR's guidance on peer sexual harassment. See
id. In fact, OCR encourages those schools to follow the policy guidance to ensure
"students a safe and nondiscriminatory educational environment." Id.
103. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682.
104. See id. The pertinent part of § 1682 states:
Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may
be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue
assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom
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knowledged that this sanction serves to accomplish the first objective of
Title IX. a05 Nonetheless, it does not accomplish the second objective in
every instance. 10 6 For example, a recipient with a one-time grant is not
prevented from using the money in furtherance of future discriminatory
practices. 10 7 Consequently, the Supreme Court, in Cannon v. University of
Chicago,10 8 held that a private cause of action exists under Title IX despite
the absence of express authorization in the statute itself.10 9 The Cannon
Court concluded that an "individual remedy will provide effective assist-
ance" in achieving the objectives of Title IX. 110
After Cannon, Title IX sexual harassment cases were rare mainly be-
cause the Cannon Court did not clarify whether compensatory relief was
available.'1 1 Thus, early Title IX cases, which generally involved students
compelling schools to adopt equitable sports programs, sought only in-
there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity for
hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement.... or (2) by any
other means authorized by law ....
Id.
105. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704-05. The Court, however, recognized that the
first objective will not always be served unless a private right of action is available.
See id. at 704 n.37; see also Sherer, supra note 6, at 2143-47 (outlining process for
filing complaint under Title IX).
106. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 705.
107. See id. at 704 n.37; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (stating sanctions for violation
of Title IX).
108. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
109. Id. at 705-06, 717. The Court stated that it is not only sensible to allow a
private remedy, but it is also fully consistent with enforcement of the statute. See id.
at 706. The Supreme Court reaffirmed Cannon with regard to a private cause of
action under Title IX in Franklin v. Gwinnett County School District, 503 U.S. 60, 65-
66 (1992).
110. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 707. The Court further stated that:
When Congress intends private litigants to have a cause of action to sup-
port their statutory rights, the far better course is for it to specify as much
when it creates those rights. But the Court has long recognized that
under certain limited circumstances the failure of Congress to do so is
not inconsistent with an intent on its part to have such a remedy available
to the persons benefitted by its legislation. Title IX presents the atypical
situation in which all of the circumstances . . . [are] supportive of an
implied remedy ....
Id. at 717.
111. See generally Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 884 (1st
Cir. 1988) (alleging sexual harassment under Title IX in medical program); Moire
v. Temple Univ. Sch. of Med., 613 F. Supp. 1360, 1363 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (recogniz-
ing hostile environment sexual harassment in educational context), affid, 800 F.2d
1136 (3d Cir. 1986); Alexander v. Yale Univ., 459 F. Supp. 1, 4 (D. Conn. 1977)
(recognizing quid pro quo sexual harassment under Title IX), affd on other
grounds, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980); Bukoffsky, supra note 6, at 179 (discussing
limitation of Title IX remedies); Rinestine, supra note 6, at 812 (finding that
Supreme Court did not hold whether compensatory relief is available under Title
IX).
990 [Vol. 42: p. 969
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junctive relief.112 This dearth of Title IX sexual harassment cases ended
after the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools." 1
3
In Franklin, a teacher employed by the school district continually sex-
ually harassed a high school student. 1" 4 The student alleged that when
she reported the teacher's behavior to the school district, it took no action
to remedy the situation and discouraged her from bringing charges.
11 5
The Franklin Court concluded that, absent contrary direction by Congress,
federal courts have the power to award "any appropriate relief' in a private
right of action pursuant to a federal statute. 116 Thus, the Court expressly
112. See Bukoffsky, supra note 6, at 179; see also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991
F.2d 888, 895-904 (1st Cir. 1993) (finding Title IX violation based on demotion of
women's gymnastics and volleyball programs from varsity status); Yellow Springs
Exempted Village Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 647
F.2d 651, 655-56 (6th Cir. 1981) (applying Title IX to compel equality in sports
program); Canterino v. Barber, 564 F. Supp. 711, 714-15 (W.D. Ky. 1983) (apply-
ing Title IX to compel equality in vocational classes); Deidre G. Duncan, Com-
ment, Gender Equity in Women's Athletics, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 1027, 1027 (1996)
(attributing growth of female participation in intercollegiate athletics over last
twenty years to enforcement of Title IX); Susan M. Shook, Note, The Title IX Tug-of-
War and Intercollegiate Athletics in the 1990's: Nonrevenue Men's Team Join Women Ath-
letes in the Scramble for Survival, 71 IND. L.J. 773, 782-93 (1996) (discussing recent
Title IX cases involving athletic departments); Denise K. Stellmach, Note, Title IX:
The Mandate for Equality in Collegiate Athletics, 41 WAYNE L. REv. 203, 203 (1994)
(stating that "[t]oday Title IX does more than prevent discrimination in college
athletics" and further discussing how equality in college athletics was advanced by
Title IX).
113. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). Before Franklin, there were only three other re-
ported federal court cases on sexual harassment under Title IX. See Lipsett, 864
F.2d at 914 (finding arguable claims of quid pro quo and hostile environment
sexual harassment in medical program where plaintiff was employee and student);
Alexander v. Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178, 185-86 (3d Cir. 1986) (recognizing quid pro
quo sexual harassment in educational context); Moire, 613 F. Supp. at 1362-64
(claiming sexual harassment by supervisor in psychiatric clerkship).
114. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 63. The student alleged that the teacher engaged
her in sexually oriented conversations about her sexual experiences with her boy-
friend and asked whether she would consider engaging in sexual intercourse with
an older man. See id. The teacher constantly called the student at home and on
several occasions excused her from class and took her to a private office where he
subjected her to coercive intercourse. See id.
115. See id. at 64. The teacher also sexually harassed other female students.
See id. Again, the administration and teachers discouraged the complaints and
took no action. See id. The teacher eventually resigned on the condition that all
matters pending against him be dropped. See id.
116. See id.; see also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 595
(1983) (acknowledging federal court's power to specify type of relief when right of
action exists). The Court further stated that Congress did not limit nor intend to
limit the remedies available in an action under Title IX, because Congress did not
restrict the private right of action recognized in Cannon. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66-
73. Moreover, Congress did not attempt to restrict the availability of remedies
available under a Title IX suit in the two amendments to Title IX. Id. at 72-73
(citing Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1845,
and Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28).
19971 NOTE
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held that monetary damages are available in an action brought to enforce
Title IX. 117 Moreover, the Court recognized teacher-to-student sexual
harassment as actionable under Title IX. 118 The Court stated that Gwin-
nett County Public Schools had a duty under Title IX not to discriminate
on the basis of sex, and when a teacher sexually abuses or harasses a stu-
dent, that teacher discriminates on the basis of sex. 119 Further, the Court
concluded that Congress did not intend for federal aid to be expended in
support of intentional actions it sought to proscribe in a federal statute. 120
In the wake of Franklin, sexual harassment cases under Title IX in-
creased. The first federal court case to affirmatively recognize quid pro
quo and hostile environment sexual harassment under Title IX in an edu-
cational context was Moire v. Temple University School of Medicine.12 ' In
Moire, the student alleged that her clerkship supervisor's conduct created
a sexually harassing atmosphere, and university administrators promoted
such an environment when they refused to take action.122 The court
found that, although there was no allegation of quid pro quo harassment
in this case, the EEOC guidelines on sexual hostile work environment are
applicable in a Title IX context.125 Thus, the court recognized both types
of sexual harassment as legitimate causes of action under Title IX, even
though it held that the plaintiff failed to establiish her Title IX claim
against the supervisor and university.' 24
Following Moire, other courts have recognized that Title IX encom-
passes a claim for hostile environment sexual harassment in which the hos-
tile environment was created by a teacher or other agent of the school. 125
117. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76; see also Sherer, supra note 6, at 2150 (discuss-
ing Franklin decision and its role in development of Title IX case law).
118. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75.
119. See id. The Court adopted the rule set forth in Meritor Savings Bank. See
id. For a discussion of Meritor Savings Bank, see supra notes 75-81 and accompany-
ing text.
120. See Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75.
121. 613 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Pa. 1985), affd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
122. Id. at 1366; see also Rinestine, supra note 6, at 814 (discussing Moire deci-
sion and its place in development of Title IX case law).
123. See Moire, 613 F. Supp. at 1366-67 n.2 (stating that "[EEOC guidelines]
explicitly recognize... [quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual harassment]
... these guidelines seem equally applicable to Title IX") (citations omitted). For
a detailed discussion of the EEOC guidelines, see supra notes 69-73 and accompa-
nying text.
124. See Rinestine, supra note 6, at 814 (discussing in detail Moire decision).
125. See, e.g., Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1233 (10th Cir. 1996) (dis-
missing action for hostile educational environment under Title IX because plain-
tiff could not prove harassment was based on sex); Murray v. New York Univ.
College of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that educational insti-
tution may be liable under Title VII standards in Title IX suit); Bruneau v. South
Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 179 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying school
district's motion for summary judgment in Title IX hostile learning environment
claim); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1427 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(analyzing hostile environment sexual harassment claim under Tide VII standard);
Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1290-93 (N.D. Cal.
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The courts, however, are divided as to which analytical framework to apply
in Title IX cases against the school district in which the hostile environ-
ment was created by a student upon another student: a Title VII legal stan-
dard or a statutory interpretation of Title IX. 126 Courts holding that
school districts may be liable under Title IX for peer sexual harassment
apply a Title VII legal standard. 127 These courts agree that a Title VII
sexual harassment analysis is the closest analog to peer sexual harassment
cases under Title IX and to establish a prima facie case of peer hostile
environment sexual harassment, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) he or
she belongs to a protected group; (2) he or she was subject to unwelcome
sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harass-
ment was sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of his or
her education, creating an abusive educational environment; and (5)
there is some basis for institutional liability. 128 These courts, however,
1993) (holding that law permits plaintiffs to state claim of hostile environment
sexual harassment under Title IX).
126. Compare Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.)
(holding school district not liable for peer hostile environment sexual harass-
ment), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996), with Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 162 (alleg-
ing Title IX claim against school district for peer sexual harassment which created
hostile learning environment), Petaluma City, 949 F. Supp. at 1427 (concluding
that applicable standard in peer hostile environment sexual harassment claim
under Title IX should be "traditional [T]itle VII hostile environment standard"),
and Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1022-23 (W.D. Mo. 1995)
(allowing cause of action against school board for peer hostile environment sexual
harassment under Title IX).
127. See Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988) (stat-
ing Title VII is appropriate standard for claims arising under Title IX); Bruneau,
935 F. Supp. at 162 (discussing application of Title VII standards to Title IX cases);
Petaluma City, 949 F. Supp. at 1427 (concluding that Title VII hostile environment
standard should be applied as matter of public policy).
One court criticized the Rowinsky decision as missing the "actual thrust of [a
peer sexual harassment] claim." Petaluma City, 949 F. Supp. at 1420-21. It asserted
that such claims are based "not on the harassing conduct of its students, but on the
[school] district's own conduct of knowingly permitting the discriminatory hostile
and abusive environment to continue. Rowinsky does not recognize that inaction
may constitute actionable discrimination." Id. at 1421.
128. See, e.g., Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412,
1416 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (stating that Supreme Court acknowledged in Franklin that
student could state claim for monetary damages for school district's violation of
Title IX by alleging that school district intentionally failed to remedy harassing
conduct); Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 171 (holding that court will use legal standards
from Title VII to guide its analysis in Title IX peer hostile environment sexual
harassment claim because Title IX prohibits same conduct prohibited by Title
VII); Petaluma City, 949 F. Supp. at 1426 (concluding that if school district knows of
sexual harassment and fails to develop and implement policies to remedy such
harassment, "it must be inferred that the [school district] intended the inevitable
result of that failure, that is, a hostile environment"; thus, Title VII standard for
intentional discrimination is appropriate standard); Burrow v. Postville Commu-
nity Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1204 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (stating that "Supreme
Court's utilization of its Title VII case law to interpret Title IX in Franklin strongly
indicates that Title VII precedent is appropriate for analysis of hostile environment
sexual harassment claims under Title IX"); Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1023 (stating that
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have diverged in their analysis of the fifth prong.12 9 Some courts have
held that a school district may be liable under Title IX for peer hostile
environment sexual harassment if it knew of the harassment and inten-
tionally failed to take proper remedial measures because of the plaintiff's
sex. 130 Another court has restricted the standard to require actual knowl-
edge by the school district of the sexual harassment and its failure to take
appropriate remedial action, regardless of intent.13 1 Contrarily, another
court has concluded that a school district may be liable if it knew or
adapting Title VII standards to Title IX cases will further Title IX's congressional
purpose of not allowing federal monies to be expended in support of intentional,
invidious discrimination based on sex).
A number of commentators also support using Title VII case law to analyze a
Title IX claim. See, e.g., Eriksson, supra note 6, at 1810 ("Because courts are willing
to look to Title VII for a definition of sexual harassment, logically they should
employ Title VII principles to determine whether a school or school district should
be liable for sexual harassment under Title IX."); Gant, supra note 15, at 517 (stat-
ing that courts should logically apply Title VII case law to Title IX cases); Lovato,
supra note 6, at 393 (arguing that courts should use Title VII analysis in Title IX
claims); Miller, supra note 6, at 720 (stating that using Title VII analysis ensures
broader and more thorough application of Title IX); Sherer, supra note 6, at 2157
(proposing use of Title VII analysis for claims of hostile academic environment
sexual harassment under Title IX).
129. Compare Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at 1205-06 (holding that school' districts
may be liable for peer hostile environment sexual harassment under Title IX if
they knew of harassment and intentionally failed to take proper remedial measures
because of plaintiffs sex), and Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1420 (following standard in
Burrow because it ensures that educational institution will have notice of its poten-
tial Title IX liability), with Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 173 (holding that plaintiff in
Title IX peer hostile environment sexual harassment case must show that school
board received actual notice of sexual harassing conduct and failed to take action
to remedy it and concluding that showing of constructive notice only will not be
enough for liability), Petaluma City, 949 F. Supp. at 1426 (concluding that school
district may be liable under Title IX for peer hostile environment sexual harass-
ment if it actually knew, or should have known in exercising its legal duties, of such
harassment and did not take prompt, appropriate remedial action), and Bosley, 904
F. Supp. at 1025 (holding that school district may be liable for Title IX peer hostile
environment sexual harassment violation if it had sufficient notice of its liability
and failed to take appropriate remedial action and finding that no notice problem
exists if school intentionally discriminates).
In its recent policy guidance on sexual harassment, OCR stated that a school
district violates Title IX if it had actual or constructive notice of the hostile envi-
ronment and failed to take immediate and appropriate corrective action, even if
the student did not use the school's existing sexual harassment grievance proce-
dures. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 102, at 12042.
130. See Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1420 (stating that not only must school district
have known of sexual harassment but it must also have intentionally failed to rem-
edy situation because of plaintiffs sex); Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at 1205-06 (same);
Bosley, 904 F. Supp. at 1025 (stating that school district must have had "sufficient
notice of its potential liability" and that no notice problem exists if school inten-
tionally discriminated based on sex).
131. See Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 173 (holding that liability will not lie on
constructive notice only, rather actual notice of harassing conduct is required).
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should have known of the sexual harassment and failed to take prompt
remedial action.' 3 2
Presently, only two federal courts of appeals have addressed the issue
of school district liability for peer sexual harassment under Title TX.' 33
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education,'34 held that Title IX imposed liability on
the school board for peer sexual harassment, when the school board
knowingly allowed the harasser to create a hostile environment.' 35 The
plaintiff in Davis alleged that the school board's failure to take action to
stop the harassing conduct denied benefits of education to the plaintiff
based on her sex. 136 Applying a Title VII based analysis, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit held that the plaintiff established a prima facie claim under Title IX
because of the school board's failure to take appropriate action to remedy
a sexually hostile environment. 13 7 Six months later, however, the Elev-
enth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc in the case and vacated its previ-
ous opinion. 138
132. See Petaluma City, 949 F. Supp. at 1426 (reasoning that this approach
gives schools appropriate amount of discretion in determining how best to re-
spond to harassment).
133. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir.)
(holding that school district is not liable for peer hostile environment sexual har-
assment under Title IX), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996); Davis v. Monroe County
Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1190 (1lth Cir.) (holding school board liable under
Title IX for failing to remedy hostile learning environment resulting from peer
sexual harassment), vacated, 91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).
134. 74 F.3d 1186 (l1th Cir.), vacated, 91 F.3d 1418 (l1th Cir. 1996).
135. See id. at 1188. A male fifth-grader continually sexually harassed a female
classmate. See id. The school district, upon learning of the harassment, took no
action to remedy the situation and the "requests for protection went untflfilled."
Id. at 1189. As a result of the continued harassment, the female classmate suffered
mental and emotional problems, and her grades dropped. See id. The Eleventh
Circuit held that if the school board knowingly allowed the harasser to create a
hostile environment, then it violated Title IX. See id. at 1188.
136. See id. Plaintiff's requests to the school for protection went unfulfilled.
See id. at 1189. School officials never disciplined the harasser for sexually harassing
the plaintiff. See id.
137. See id. at 1194-95. The court stated that the plaintiff in this type of sexual
harassment case must prove:
(1) that she is a member of a protected group; (2) that she was subject to
unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based on sex;
(4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter
the conditions of her education and create an abusive educational envi-
ronment; and (5) that some basis for institutional liability has been
established.
Id. at 1194. The court further stated that to determine whether the environment is
hostile or abusive, courts must be concerned with the frequency of the abusive
conduct, its severity, "whether it is physically threatening or humiliating rather
than merely offensive," and "whether it unreasonably interferes with the plaintiff's
performance." Id. (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993)).
138. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1418 (11th Cir. 1996).
A majority of the judges in the court voted in favor of granting a rehearing en banc
and vacating the previous panel's opinion. See id. at 1418. At the time of this Note,
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The Fifth Circuit, in Rowinsky, is the only other federal court of ap-
peals to address this issue. 13 9 The Rowinsky court held that Title IX does
not impose liability on a school district for peer hostile environment sex-
ual harassment, when the school district itself did not directly discriminate
based on sex. 140 The court stated that in a peer sexual harassment case,
the plaintiff must show that the school district responded differently to
claims of sexual harassment based on the plaintiffs sex.14 1 To date, the
Rowinsky court is the only federal court of appeals holding that Title IX
does not impose liability on school districts for peer sexual harassment.'
42
D. State Statutes Directed at Sexual Harassment in Schools
In response to the increasingly prevalent problem of sexual harass-
ment in schools, several states have enacted legislation to address the is-
sue. 143 Minnesota was the first state to legislate on sexual harassment in
schools.144 Minnesota amended its antidiscrimination statute to expressly
prohibit sexual harassment and defined it as "unwelcome sexual advances"
the rehearing had occurred but the court had not handed down an opinion. Tele-
phone Interview with The National Women's Law Center, Attorney for Appellant
(Mar. 14, 1997).
139. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1007 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996). For a discussion of the facts in Rowinsky, see
supra notes 25-55 and accompanying text. For an account of the Rowinsky court's
analysis, see infra notes 163-201 and accompanying text.
140. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1008.
141. See id. at 1016.
142. See id. at 1010-16 (holding Tide IX does not impose liability on school
district for peer hostile environment sexual harassment after interpreting statute's
plain language, legislative history and agency promulgations).
143. See Sherer, supra note 6, at 2136 (discussing individual schools that have
implemented sexual harassment policies and procedures). Many of the ap-
proaches include developing a specific sexual harassment policy, disseminating the
policy around school and developing and disseminating grievance procedures. See
id. Disciplinary actions include participation in a program or research project on
sexual harassment, an apology to the victim, parent conference, detention, suspen-
sion, expulsion or referral to the police. See id. at 2136-37.
Some schools have implemented sexual harassment programs or workshops.
See Shelley Donald Coolidge, In the Halls of Learning Students Get Lessons in Sexual
Harassment, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 18, 1996, at 1, available in 1996 WL
5044305 (discussing local sexual harassment programs). For example, at
Framingham High School in Massachusetts, the tenth-grade health class receives
five lessons on sexual harassment. See id. Similarly, at East High School in Alaska,
a day-long sexual harassment workshop is offered to students every other month.
See id. At Stevens Point Area Senior High School in Wisconsin, students travel
throughout the state and perform a play on sexual harassment called "Alice in
Sexual Assault Land." Id. At the Minuteman Regional Vocational Technical High
School in Lexington, Massachusetts, incoming freshmen attend sexual harassment
training classes where they discuss genuine instances of sexual harassment and
read court cases on the topic. See Saltzman, supra note 6, at 7377.
144. See Miller, supra note 6, at 712-14 (discussing state-enacted legislation re-
garding sexual harassment in schools); Rinestine, supra note 6, at 826-28 (same);
Sherer, supra note 6, at 2139-43 (same).
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or "physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature" that creates a
hostile or offensive environment at work or in school. 14 5 Furthermore,
Minnesota was the first state to require its school boards to adopt written
sexual harassment policies that conform to the definition of sexual harass-
ment set out in the antidiscrimination statute.1 46 Such policies must set
forth grievance procedures and disciplinary sanctions. 14 7 Each school
must also develop a process for discussing the sexual harassment policy
with its students and school employees. 148 Furthermore, the sexual har-
assment policies apply to all children in kindergarten and grades one
through twelve.' 49 Thus far, two cases, neither of which went to trial, have
arisen involving peer sexual harassment in Minnesota. 1 50 In both cases,
the Department of Human Rights, the state agency charged with enforc-
ing sexual harassment legislation, ruled against the school district for fail-
ing to take appropriate action.' 5
1
145. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01.41 (West 1993). The statute states in perti-
nent part:
"Sexual harassment" includes unwelcome sexual advances, requests for
sexual favors, sexually motivated physical contact or other verbal or physi-
cal conduct or communication of a sexual nature when: ... (3) that con-
duct or communication has the purpose or effect of substantially
interfering with an individual's employment .... educational, or housing
environment; and in the case of employment, the employer knows or
should know of the existence of the harassment and fails to take timely
and appropriate action.
Id.
146. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 127.46 (West 1993). The statute states in part:
"Each school board shall adopt a written sexual .... harassment and sexual, ....




149. See Rinestine, supra note 6, at 826 (discussing Minnesota's sexual harass-
ment legislation). The Minnesota Board of Education approved the use of a vol-
untary curriculum that uses puppets and storytelling to explain the issue of sexual
harassment to children in kindergarten through third grade. See Saltzman, supra
note 6, at 7377. Under this curriculum, children in grades four through six "ana-
lyze how television programs and advertising promote sexual stereotypes." Id.
Children in the upper grade levels also write letters to sexual harassment offend-
ers. See id.
150. See Minnesota Department of Human Rights, REF: 360 (1991) (Gorman,
Enforcement Supervisor) (alleging school district failed to take adequate action
regarding sexual harassment complaints thus contributing to offensive educational
atmosphere) [hereinafter Chaska Case]; Minnesota Department of Human Rights,
REF: 341 (1990) (Lapinsky, Director) (alleging school district failed to take timely,
appropriate action to remove sexually offensive graffiti on walls of bathroom stall)
[hereinafter Duluth Case]; see also JoAnn Strauss, Peer Sexual Harassment of High
School Students: A Reasonable Student Standard and An Affirmative Duty Imposed on Edu-
cational Institutions, 10 LAw & INEQ. J. 163, 173-78 (1992) (detailing Minnesota
cases and their implications); Sherer, supra note 6, at 2140-41 (discussing Minne-
sota cases).
151. See Strauss, supra note 150, at 173-74; Sherer, supra note 6, at 2140 &
n. 115. In the first case, the Duluth School District became the first school district
in the United States to pay damages under a peer sexual harassment claim. See
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I California is another state to pass legislation prohibiting sexual har-
assment in schools. 15 2 Similar to the Minnesota statute, the California
statute defines sexual harassment as "unwanted sexual advances, requests
for sexual favors, and other verbal, visual, or physical conduct of a sexual
nature" made at work or in an educational setting.153 Moreover, each ed-
ucational institution in California must adopt a written sexual harassment
policy that includes information on grievance procedures and available
remedies. 154 The California legislation, however, does not require schools
to implement programs that apply to children in kindergarten and grades
one through three. 155 California also passed a statute allowing the princi-
pal or superintendent to suspend or expel a student if the student engages
in sexual harassment as previously defined. 156
Contrary to the Minnesota and California statutes, Texas does not
mandate its school districts to develop sexual harassment policies, rather it
Strauss, supra note 150, at 174-76. The victim received a $15,000 settlement be-
cause school officials failed to remove crude graffiti about her on the bathroom
wall. See id.
Later, the Chaska School District was held liable for peer sexual harassment
when the administrators failed to respond to a complaint by a female student
against male students who circulated a list of twenty-five girls they found sexually
desirable. See id. at 176-77. The list also included graphic descriptions of the girls'
bodies. See id.
152. See CAL. EDIJC. CODE § 212.5 (West 1994).
153. See id. Section 212.5 states:
For purposes of this chapter, "sexual harassment" means unwelcome sex-
ual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal, visual, or physi-
cal conduct of a sexual nature, made by someone from or in the work or
educational setting, under any of the following conditions:
(a) Submission to the conduct is explicitly or implicitly made a term or a
condition of an individual's employment, academic status, or progress.
(b) Submission to, or rejection of, the conduct by the individual is used
as the basis of employment or academic decisions affecting the
individual.
(c) The conduct has the purpose or effect of having a negative impact
upon the individual's work or academic performance, or of creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive work or educational environment.
(d) Submission to, or rejection of, the conduct by the individual is used
as the basis for any decision affecting the individual regarding benefits
and services, honors, programs, or activities available at or through the
educational institution.
Id.
154. See id. § 212.6(b), (c).
155. See id. § 48900.2 (West 1994) (exempting children in kindergarten and
grades one through three); see also Rinestine, supra note 6, at 826-27 (discussing
California and Minnesota legislation regarding sexual harassment in schools);
Sherer, supra note 6, at 2141 (discussing California legislation on sexual harass-
ment policy in schools).
156. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900.2. The statute further states that the conduct
must be considered "by a reasonable person of the same gender as the victim to be
sufficiently severe or pervasive to have a negative impact upon the individual's aca-
demic performance or to create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive educational
environment." Id.
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makes such policies optional. 15 7 Texas enacted a statute stating that "each
school district may develop and implement a sexual harassment policy."' 58
Moreover, Texas does not outline what these policies must include and
what remedies are available.159
Similarly, Pennsylvania adopted legislation authorizing the Penn-
sylvania Human Relations Commission ("Commission") to prepare, in
conjunction with the state Department of Education, a comprehensive ed-
ucational program for the students of the schools in the Common-
wealth. 160 The purposes of such a program are to "eliminate prejudice
against" and to "further good will among all persons" without regard to,
inter alia, sex.161 Pennsylvania, like Texas, does not.mandate these pro-
grams; rather, it merely grants authorization to state agencies to imple-
ment educational programs if the agencies wish. 162
IV. THE ROWiNsKY DECISION
A. The Fifth Circuit's Analysis of Title IX
Previously, the district court in Rowinsky, relying on factors such as the
type of punishment given to boys who assaulted boys and to boys who as-
saulted girls, held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim under Title IX
because she did not provide evidence that the school district treated sex-
ual harassment toward girls less severely than that toward boys. 163 On ap-
peal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and, based on
statutory interpretation, held that Title IX does not impose liability on a
school district absent allegations that the school district itself directly dis-
criminated based on sex. 164
157. See id. The statute states in part: "(b) Each school district may develop
and implement a sexual harassment policy to be included in the district improve-
ment plan .... ." Id. (emphasis added).
158. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.083(b) (West 1996) (emphasis added).
159. See id.
160. See 43 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 958 (West 1996). The statute states in part:
"The Commission, in cooperation with the Department of Education, is author-
ized to prepare a comprehensive educational program, designed for the students
of the schools in this Commonwealth .. .in order to eliminate prejudice against
and to further good will among all persons, without regard to ... sex .... " Id.
161. Id.
162. But see Rinestine, supra note 6, at 827-28 (stating that in 1993, Penn-
sylvania House of Representatives considered bill mandating school boards to
adopt written harassment policy and sexual harassment policy) (citing Pa. H.B.
2185, 176th General Assembly, § 5.4(d) (1) (1993)); PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY OF
HOUSE BILLs AND RESOLUTIONS A-297 (1993-94 Sessions), printed ly Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania (describing HB 2185 as amending Pennsylvania Human Relations
Act to prohibit harassment and sexual harassment). The bill would have required
that such policies outline grievance procedures and disciplinary actions. See Rines-
tine, supra note 6, at 828 n.184. To date, the Pennsylvania legislature has not en-
acted such a bill.
163. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996).
164. See id. at 1008.
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The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by considering the language of
Title IX. 16 5 The Fifth Circuit found that the text of Title IX states three
general prohibitions.1 66 The prohibitions are that no person: (1) shall be
excluded from participation in a federally funded program; (2) shall be
denied the benefits of such a program; or (3) shall be subjected to dis-
crimination under the program. 167 The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that
Title IX's prohibitions are not explicitly limited to grant recipients.1 68 By
examining the placement and purpose of Title IX's language in the statu-
tory scheme, the court concluded that Title IX does not limit "'who' is
prohibited from discriminating against students in an educational pro-
gram."169 The court found that Congress drafted Title IX with a focus on
identifying the benefitted class rather than on identifying who was prohib-
ited from discriminating against persons in federally funded educational
programs and activities. 170 Therefore, Title IX's language is driven by the
nature of the right protected, not by the class of wrongdoers.1 71 The
court, however, concluded that "the open-ended language of [T]itle IX
does not support an inference that the statute applies to the conduct of
third parties." 17 2
The court, then, examined three factors in favor of limiting liability
under Title IX to only the acts of grant recipients. 173 First, the court ex-
amined the scope and structure of Title IX.1 7 4 In so doing, the court con-
165. See id. at 1010. In determining the scope of Title IX, the court stated
that it is important not only to consider the "'bare meaning of the words but also
its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme."' Id. at 1012 (quoting Bailey v.
United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 506 (1995)).
166. See id.
167. See id.; see also, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a) (1994) (setting out language of Title
IX).
168. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1012.
169. Id.
170. See id. "Title IX was drafted in a way that identifies a benefitted class in
order to imply a private right of action." Id.; see also Cannon v. University of Chi-
cago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-93 (1979) (stating that Congress drafted Tide IX with "un-
mistakable focus on the benefitted class").
In Cannon, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized an implied private right of
action to enforce Title IX. See id. The Court stated that because Congress drafted
Title IX focusing on a benefitted class, there was reason to "infer a private remedy
in favor of individual persons." Id.
171. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1012. The Fifth Circuit draws support for this
conclusion from the Supreme Court's opinion in Cannon. See id. at 1012 n.13.
The Cannon Court stated that a statute conferring a right to be free from discrimi-
nation will almost always be phrased in terms of the benefitted class because such a
right is a personal one. See id.
172. Id.
173. See id. Like the Fifth Circuit's opinion, this Note refers to both the grant
recipient and its agents as "grant recipients." See id. at 1011 n.10.
174. See id. at 1012-13. Pursuant to Congress's spending power, Title IX
grants funds to recipients in return for the "recipient's adherence to the condi-
tions of the grant." Id. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has not spoken on the
issue of whether Title IX was enacted pursuant to Congress's spending power
1000 [Vol. 42: p. 969
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cluded that because Congress enacted Title IX pursuant to its spending
power, the statute prohibits discriminatory acts only by grant recipients.1 75
Under Tide IX, a recipient receives federal funds only upon compliance
with the conditions of the grant.176 The Fifth Circuit stated that to impose
liability upon the grant recipient for the conduct of third parties would be
inconsistent with the purpose of the spending condition.' 77 Because
grant recipients have little control over the acts of third parties, the possi-
bility of violating the spending condition would likely induce recipients to
turn down the grants. 178 This in turn would render the condition almost
useless.179
The court further stated that Tide IX's structure and emphasis sup-
port the interpretation that the statute only applies to grant recipients. 180
The court noted that with the exception of one phrase, the statute dis-
cusses discrimination only by grant recipients.' 81 For example, there are
provisions in the statute that exempt certain entities and practices from
coverage, such as the girls and boys scouts, beauty pageants and Girls and
Boys State.' 8 2 The court concluded that this emphasis on grant recipients
rather than section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 1012 n.14. Prece-
dent, however, strongly suggests that Title IX, similar to its model, Title VI, was
enacted under Congress's spending power. See id.; see also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 598-99 (1983) (holding that Tide VI was enacted
pursuant to Spending Clause). Therefore, the inference that Title IX was enacted
pursuant to the Spending Clause arises because Tide IX was modeled after Title
VI. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1012 n.14.
175. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1012. The Fifth Circuit stated:
Although the Supreme Court has reserved the issue of whether [T]itle IX
was enacted under the Spending Clause rather than § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, precedent strongly suggests that [T]itle IX, like its
model, [T]itle VI, was enacted under the former . . . . Title IX was
modeled after [T]itle VI and uses identical language, giving rise to an
inference that [T]itle IX also was enacted pursuant to the Spending
Clause.
Id. at 1012 n.14.
176. See id. at 1013.
177. See id. The purpose of a spending condition is to induce the grant recipi-
ent to comply with the conditions in order to receive grants. See id. Therefore, the
"likelihood of violating the prohibition cannot be too great" if the coercion is to be
effective. Id.
178. See id.
179. See id. The court further found it unlikely that Congress would impose
conditions on federal funds and make it so unattractive to potential recipients. See
id.
180. See id.
181. See id. The phrase Rowinsky relies upon is "[nIo person shall be sub-
jected to discrimination under any educational program or activities." See id. at
1011 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1993)) (emphasis added). The plaintiff ar-
gued that "under" means "in" not "by." See id. Therefore, according to Rowinsky,
the statute should not be limited to only the acts of discrimination by the grant
recipient. See id.
182. See id. at 1013 n.16.
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supports the conclusion that the statute only applies to the practices of
grant recipients.' 83
The court also considered Title IX's legislative history.184 Citing the
Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the purpose of Title IX is
to "prevent discrimination by grant recipients."1 8 5 The court found that
in the debates and numerous statements regarding the amendment, sup-
porters and opponents of Title IX focused mainly on the conduct of grant
recipients.186 The court concluded that the drafters of Title IX viewed the
amendment as only an "important first step" to give women an equal
chance at something "rightfully theirs."' 8 7 Thus, Title IX was not in-
tended to cure all types of discrimination. 18
8
Finally, the court turned to the Department of Education's OCR in-
terpretation of Title IX. 189 The court concluded that the implementing
183. See id. at 1013.
184. See id. at 1013-16.
185. Id. at 1013. In reviewing Title IX's legislative history, the Supreme Court
concluded that the statute, similar to Title VI, sought to accomplish two objectives:
(1) "to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices" and
(2) "to provide individual citizens effective protection against those practices."
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979); see Grove City College
v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 557 (1983) (Powell,J., concurring) (stating purpose of statute
is to make "unlawful 'discrimination' by recipients of federal assistance
programs").
186. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1014. Senator Bayh, who introduced the amend-
ment, stated that the purpose of the amendment was to ban sex discrimination in
educational programs receiving federal assistance. See 118 CONG. REc. 5803
(1972). "[Slex discrimination reaches into all facets of education - admissions,
scholarship programs, faculty hiring and promotion, professional staffing, and pay
scales." Id. The Senator further stated that there are three basic types of discrimi-
nation that the amendment was designed to remedy: (1) "discrimination in admis-
sion to an institution," (2) "discrimination of available services or studies within an
institution once students are admitted" and (3) "discrimination in employment
within an institution, as a member of a faculty or whatever." Id. at 5812.
The Fifth Circuit noted that normally the statements of a legislator would not
be controlling. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1014 n.19. Yet, Senator Bayh's remarks,
coming from the sponsor of the language that was enacted, have been treated as
authoritative in interpreting the statute's construction. See id.; see also North Haven
Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982) ("Senator Bayh's remarks, as those
of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted, are an authoritative guide to
the statute's construction."); Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426
U.S. 548, 564 (1976) (according statements by legislative sponsor "substantial
weight").
187. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1014.
188. See id. The drafters realized that further legislation might be necessary.
See id. In fact, the original amendment mandated a study on sex discrimination to
suggest further legislative remedies. See id.
189. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1014-15. The OCR is responsible for investigat-
ing and enforcing institutional compliance with Title IX. See 20 U.S.C. § 3413
(1994). The Fifth Circuit noted that appreciable deference should be accorded to
OCR's interpretations. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1014 n.20. Such deference depends
on factors such as "circumstances of [the regulations'] promulgation, the consis-
tency with which the agency has adhered to the position announced, the evident
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regulations for Title IX support its refusal to impose liability on recipients
for the actions of third parties. 190 Moreover, the court noted that, even
though OCR has commented on sexual harassment by employees and
agents of recipients, at the time it had not resolved the issue of peer sexual
harassment. 19 1 The court further stated that the "only OCR documents to
apply Title IX to peer sexual harassment" are in the recent Letters of Find-
ing, which should be accorded little weight.' 9 2
Based upon statutory interpretation, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's judgment and held that the plaintiff in a peer sexual harass-
ment case under Title IX must "demonstrate that the school district
responded to sexual harassment claims differently based on sex."q 93 The
Fifth Circuit further concluded that the recipient of federal funds cannot
be liable for sexual harassment when the perpetrator is a party other than
the grant recipient or its agent.' 9 4
consideration which has gone into its formulation, and the nature of the agency's
expertise." Id.
190. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1015. The implementing regulations for Title IX
address only the acts of the recipients themselves. See id. The specific prohibition
in 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(b) (7) states in part: "(b) Specific prohibitions. Except as pro-
vided in this subpart, in providing any aid, benefit, or service to a student, a recipi-
ent shall not, on the basis of sex: ... (7) Otherwise limit any person in the
enjoyment of any right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity." 34 C.F.R.
§ 106.31(b) (7) (1997) (emphasis added).
191. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1015. After the Rowinsky decision, however, OCR
issued a policy guidance detailing its interpretation of peer sexual harassment
under Title IX. Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 101, at 12034. For a
further discussion of the OCR policy guidance on sexual harassment, see supra
note 101.
192. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1015. These letters of finding were written dur-
ing the OCR's investigation of specific institutions, and their purpose is to compel
voluntary compliance with Title IX by an offending institution. See id. The court
concluded that such letters should be accorded little deference because the tradi-
tional factors of deference are not present, and the letters do not "reflect the delib-
erate considerations of a rulemaking proceeding." Id. Moreover, any weight the
letters might have are outweighed by the implementing regulations and Policy
Memorandum. See id.
The Fifth Circuit also noted that the only agency interpretation in favor of the
plaintiff's position are those involving Title VI. See id. at 1016. The OCR has stated
that peer hostile environment racial harassment is a violation of Title VI. See id.
(citing 59 Fed. Reg. 11448, 11449 (1994)). Yet, neither the regulations nor com-
mentary explain why Title VI would apply to the actions of non-recipients. See id.
The OCR merely cites to Title VII cases to establish that hostile environments can
be discriminatory. See id. (citing 59 Fed. Reg. 11451, 11451 (1994)). Thus, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that "[a]bsent a reasoned explanation for why the statu-
tory language supports applying [T]itle VI to peer harassment... OCR's interpre-
tation [of [Tlitie VI to peer racial harassment] should not be accorded any
deference." Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 1010, 1016.
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B. Judge Dennis's Dissent
Judge Dennis, the only dissenting judge, disagreed with the majority
opinion and concluded that Title IX imposes a duty on the school district
to take appropriate measures to protect its students from sexual harass-
ment, abuse and discrimination in the education environment when the
school has actual knowledge of the harassment, abuse or discrimina-
tion.1 95 First, Judge Dennis discussed the import of Supreme Court prece-
dents, such as Cannon and Franklin, in determining the scope of Title
IX.19 6 He concluded that Supreme Court precedent interpreted Title IX
as a "broad federal protection privately enforceable by beneficiaries of the
act."' 97 Thus, if a student is harassed by another or "even a stranger"
within the school environment, the school district would be liable under
Title IX if it fails to take corrective measures after having actual knowledge
of the sexual harassment. 19 8
Second, Judge Dennis noted that even if the school district was not
receiving federal assistance, it still had a duty to protect the students from
dangerous harm under the in loco parentis theory.1 99 He stated that
195. See id. at 1025 (Dennis, J., dissenting). Judge Dennis joined the majority
opinion only on the conclusion that Mrs. Rowinsky lacks standing under Title IX.
See id. at 1017 n.2 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
196. See id. at 1017-18 (Dennis, J., dissenting). The dissent discussed the
Supreme Court's decision in Cannon, in which it held that "Title IX is enforceable
through an implied right of action by certain classes of private parties." Rowinsky,
80 F.3d at 1017 (Dennis, J., dissenting). Next, it discussed the Supreme Court's
holding in Franklin, where it held that Title IX's implied private right of action
includes the right to a claim for money damages. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1018
(Dennis, J., dissenting). For a further discussion of Cannon and Franklin, see supra
notes 108-19 and accompanying text.
197. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1017 (Dennis, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned
that Cannon allowed a private cause of action under Title IX and Franklin placed a
duty on the school district not to discriminate based on sex in addition to allowing
money damages. See id. at 1019 (Dennis, J., dissenting). Judge Dennis stated:
[Thus] in finding that a school district can be liable under Title IX for
the unauthorized acts of its agents, the Court established that a federally
funded program may be liable for conduct extending beyond the prac-
tices, policies and decision making directly attributable to it, even though
Title IX's language is not expressly directed to conduct of the program's
agents or others.
Id. at 1020 n.6 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 1024 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
199. See id. at 1024-25 (Dennis, J., dissenting); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650 (1995) (allowing schools to perform urinalysis tests for
drugs on athletes because school authorities act in loco parentis). In Vernonia, the
Supreme Court justified its holding by stating that school authorities "'act in loco
parentis' with the power and indeed the duty to 'inculcate the habits and manners
of civility.'" Id. at 653 (citations omitted) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 684 (1986)).
The dissent addressed this issue because it felt that the majority was unwilling
to impose liability on the school district because the school had neither a duty with
regard to students' safety nor power to "control educationally pernicious student
conduct." Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1024 (Dennis, J., dissenting). The dissent noted
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Supreme Court precedent supports the notion that schools have a degree
of supervision and control over the students. 200 Therefore, according to
Judge Dennis, Title IX imposes a duty on the school district to take appro-
priate measures to protect its students from sexual harassment.20 1
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
A. What's Right and What's Wrong with Rowinsky
The majority in Rowinsky correctly concluded that Title IX does not
establish liability on school districts in peer hostile environment sexual
harassment claims. 20 2 The Fifth Circuit appropriately held that Title IX
claims for peer hostile environment sexual harassment are actionable only
if the plaintiff demonstrates that the school district itself reacted differ-
ently to such complaints based on sex.20 3 By enacting Title IX, Congress
merely intended to prevent schools from using federal monies to fund
discriminatory practices, and to provide an equal opportunity for all per-
sons in federally funded educational programs and activities. 20 4 Further-
that it is this degree of control that schools have over the students that makes it
sufficient to apply tort liability when the school, receiving federal assistance, know-
ingly fails to comply with the statutory duty to prevent sex discrimination. See id. at
1024 n.9 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
200. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1024 n.9 (Dennis, J., dissenting); see also Vernonia,
515 U.S. at 653 (stating that schools have tutelary duty to promote and inculcate
self discipline, health and good morals in students); NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 335-36 (1985) (reasoning that school authorities act in loco parentis with power
and duty to inculcate manners of civility); Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 38
F.3d 198, 203 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that school officials have obligation to
protect students from at least "certain kinds of foreseeably dangerous harm during
regular school hours").
201. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1025 (Dennis, J., dissenting). Judge Dennis con-
cluded that the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence to survive summary judg-
ment and that the Fifth Circuit should remand the case for further proceedings.
See id. (Dennis, J., dissenting).
202. See id. at 1016. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's analysis of Title IX,
see supra notes 163-94 and accompanying text.
203. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1016. Other courts disagree and apply a Title VII
analysis to Title IX peer sexual harassment cases. See, e.g., Wright v. Mason City
Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1419-20 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (stating that
Title VII analysis is "appropriate test for an actionable claim of peer sexual harass-
ment under Title IX"); Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp.
162, 169-70 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (using Title VII analysis in Title IX peer hostile envi-
ronment sexual harassment claim against school district); Doe v. Petaluma City
Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1418 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (discussing use of Title VII
analysis to analyze school district liability for peer hostile environment sexual har-
assment under Title IX); Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp.
1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (concluding that Title VII precedent is appropriate
analysis for peer hostile environment sexual harassment claim under Title IX);
Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1022 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (holding
Title VII analysis for employer liability is appropriate for enforcing provisions of
Title IX).
204. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 n.36 (1979) (re-
viewing Senator Bayh's discussion of Title IX). Senator Bayh commented that
1997] NOTE 1005
37
Lu: Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District: Does Title IX Impo
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1997
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
more, Title IX's legislative history supports the conclusion that the
legislative sponsors did not contemplate that schools should be held liable
for the actions of third parties. 20 5 Subsequent Title IX agency regulations
also focus on the actions of grant recipients by stating that a recipient shall
not limit, on the basis of sex, a person's enjoyment of any "right, privilege,
advantage or opportunity."20 6 Even though it seems as if Supreme Court
precedent has adopted a broad reading of Title IX, it is doubtful the
Court would allow an overly broad interpretation that would swallow the
original objectives and purposes of Title IX.20 7 Also, because Title IX con-
tains a spending condition, to hold grant recipients liable for third party
actions would render the condition useless and possibly discourage
schools from applying for federal aid, which would result in low budget
public schools where the students are not receiving the quality education
they could be receiving with federal assistance. 20 8
On the other hand, the majority's statutory analysis of Title IX inade-
quately addressed the issue of peer sexual harassment. First and most im-
portant, the majority did not adequately explain why it refused to apply a
Title VII legal standard to a Title IX peer sexual harassment claim. 20 9 The
Fifth Circuit simply dismissed this controversy in a lengthy footnote, stat-
ing its belief that "importing a theory of discrimination from the adult
employment context into a situation involving children is highly problem-
atic" because, on a theoretical level, peer hostile environment sexual har-
"'[Title IX] is a strong and comprehensive measure which ... is needed ... to
provide women with solid legal protection as they seek education and training for
later careers."' Id. (quoting 118 CONG. REc. 5806-07 (1972)). Representative Mink
stated that institutions that discriminate based on sex "'should not be asking the
taxpayers of this country to pay for this kind of discrimination.'" Id. at 704 n.36
(quoting 117 CONG. REc. 39252 (1971)).
205. See REDEFINING DISCRIMINATION, supra note 98, at 119 (illustrating legisla-
tive history of Title IX). Senator Bayh, who introduced the amendment, stated
that the amendment's purpose was to "wipe aside some of the discrimination that
exists today, intentionally or unintentionally." Id.
206. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.31 (1997) (setting out regulations that OCR promul-
gated regarding Title IX).
207. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 50, 76 (1992) (recog-
nizing availability of compensatory remedy under Title IX claim absent express
congressional intent); North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982)
("[]f we are to give [Title IX] the scope that its origins dictate, we must accord it a
sweep as broad as its language."); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 (recognizing implied
private right of action under Title IX absent express congressional intent).
208. See Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1012 n.14 (5th
Cir.) (noting that Title IX was modeled after Title VI, which was enacted pursuant
to Congress's spending power), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 165 (1996); see also Cannon,
441 U.S. at 704 (comparing Title IX objectives to those of its model, Title VI). The
Supreme Court resolved that Title VI was spending-power legislation rather than a
regulatory measure. See Guardian Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 598-
99 (1983). Thus, the fact that Title IX is modeled after Title VI suggests that Title
IX is also spending-power legislation. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1012.
209. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1011 n.1l (discussing problem of importing em-
ployment discrimination theory into education environment).
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assment is missing the key ingredient that workplace hostile environment
sexual harassment has-a power relationship between the fiarasser and
the victim.2 10 Although this may be true, courts who opt to apply a Title
VII-based analysis to a Title IX peer sexual harassment claim do so on the
belief that it is the best means to further Title IX's purposes of eradicating
sex discrimination in federally funded programs and preventing the use of
federal monies in discriminatory programs.2 1 ' Rather than addressing the
practical reasons advanced by other courts, the Fifth Circuit merely fo-
cused on the theoretical power relationship aspect.
21 2
Furthermore, because peer sexual harassment remains prevalent in
schools, the court needed to address the policy implications of its deci-
sion.2 13 For instance, the court did not address other avenues of relief a
plaintiff alleging peer sexual harassment may pursue against a school dis-
trict.2 14 Moreover, the court did not address the potential financial set-
backs a school may suffer if Title IX liability was imposed on the school.2 1
5
Finally, the majority did not confront the dissent's in loco parentis argument
210. See id.
211. See, e.g., Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162,
171 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (applying legal standards from Title VII to guide court's anal-
ysis in Title IX peer hostile environment sexual harassment claim because Title IX
prohibits same conduct prohibited by Title VII); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch.
Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that if school district knew
of sexual harassment and failed to implement policies to remedy such harassment,
"it must be inferred that the [school district] intended the inevitable result of that
failure"; thus Title VII analysis for intentional discrimination is appropriate); Bur-
row v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1204 (N.D. Iowa 1996)
("Supreme Court's utilization of its Title VII case law to interpret Title IX in Frank-
lin strongly indicates that Title VII precedent is appropriate for analysis of hostile
environment sexual harassment claims under Title IX."); Bosley v. Kearney R-1
Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006, 1023 (W.D. Mo. 1995) (claiming that adaptation of
Title VII standards to Title IX cases will further Title IX's congressional purpose of
preventing federal monies to be expended in support of intentional discrimina-
tion based on sex).
212. See Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1011 n.l1.
213. For a discussion of the AAUW's survey on the prevalence of peer sexual
harassment in schools, see supra note 6.
214. See Gant, supra note 15, at 493, 493 n.35 (discussing downfalls of sexual
harassment cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and citing cases that have rejected ac-
tions brought under § 1983). Plaintiffs are hesitant to bring such an action under
§ 1983 because courts have repeatedly refused to apply § 1983 to a school setting.
See id.; see also D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364,
1371 (3d Cir. 1992) (rejecting contention that school had affirmative duty to pro-
tect plaintiffs from harm).
215. See generally Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 76
(1992) (holding that monetary damages are available in action to enforce Title
IX). If found liable under Title IX for peer sexual harassment, school districts
would expend thousands of dollars in attorneys' fees and monetary damages. See
id. Even if monetary damages are not available, school districts still suffer financial
setbacks because if the schools violate Title IX, their federal funding is terminated.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1994) (listing sanctions for violation of Title IX); Eriksson,
supra note 6, at 1818 (discussing possible financial repercussions for school dis-
tricts under Title IX liability).
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for school liability, in which the Supreme Court expressly stated that
schools have disciplinary power over students and a duty to "inculcate the
habits and manners of civility."
216
Therefore, even though the Fifth Circuit's decision was appropriate,
it was also inadequate because the court did not address many significant
aspects of peer sexual harassment.
B. Wat Schools Can Do in Response to Peer Sexual Harassment
The first thing schools should do in response to peer sexual harass-
ment is to develop and implement a sexual harassment policy. 21 7 Such a
policy should specifically define what constitutes sexual harassment and
explicitly state that it shall be a violation of this policy for any student or
employee to harass another student or employee.2 18 The sexual harass-
ment policy should also outline a detailed grievance procedure for report-
ing sexual harassment complaints and establish an internal investigatory
process to handle and investigate such complaints. 2 19 Most importantly,
the sexual harassment policy must contain appropriate disciplinary meas-
ures that can range from a verbal or written warning to suspension or
expulsion depending on the circumstances. 220 Additionally, all parties
concerned in this issue, such as students, parents, teachers and school ad-
ministrators, should take part in developing the sexual harassment
policy. 22
1
After a school develops a sexual harassment policy, it has to effectively
communicate that policy to its teachers, administrators, students and par-
216. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1024-25 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (arguing that school
officials have duty to protect students while students are at school). The dissent
noted that it is this degree of control that schools have over the students that
makes it appropriate to apply tort liability when the school, receiving federal assist-
ance, knowingly fails to comply with the statutory duty to prevent sex discrimina-
tion. See id. at 1024 n.9 (Dennis, J., dissenting); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650 (1995) (recognizing school's in loco parentis authority
where school athletes were required to take urinalysis drug test); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985) (stating that school authorities act in loco parentis
with power and duty to inculcate manners of civility); Johnson v. Dallas Indep. Sch.
Dist., 38 F.3d 198, 203 n.7 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that school officials have obliga-
tion to protect students from at least "certain kinds of foreseeably dangerous harm
during regular school hours"); Eriksson, supra note 6, at 1819 (arguing that
schools have duty to set limits on student behavior).
217. See Strauss, supra note 150, at 183-84 (discussing implementation of pol-
icy statement prohibiting sexual harassment in schools); Daniel B. Tukel, Student
Versus Student: School District Liability for Peer Sexual Harassment, MiCH. Bj. Nov. 1996,
at 1154, 1157 (discussing adoption of antiharassment policy in schools). For a
discussion of antiharassment programs that specific schools around the nation
have implemented, see supra note 143.
218. See Strauss, supra note 150, at 183-84.
219. See Tukel, supra note 217, at 1157.
220. See id.
221. See Strauss, supra note 150, at 184.
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ents. 2 22 Students should be instructed on how to respond to sexually
harassing behavior and how to treat each other with courtesy and re-
spect.2 23 Teachers and school administrators should be trained on recog-
nizing sexually harassing behavior and how to respond appropriately.
2 24
Finally, the school should offer counseling services and other appropriate
aid to students who have been sexually harassed. 225 In following these
procedures, it should be the goal of the school district to provide its stu-
dents with a learning environment free of sexual harassment.
226
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Rowinsky decision only adds to the confusion in this
area of law.2 27 In the months after Rowinsky, lower federal courts have
declined to follow the Rowinsky holding.228 Instead, these courts have
opted to apply a Tide VII based analysis to Tide IX cases involving peer
sexual harassment. 229 Thus, the Rowinsky decision appears to have prece-
dential value only in future Fifth Circuit cases. A circuit court confronted
with a case in which this is an issue of first impression will have two analyti-
cal frameworks to choose from: a Tide VII based analysis or an analysis
based on a statutory interpretation of Tide IX. This, in turn, creates a set
of inconsistent case law regarding Tide IX claims against school districts.




225. See id. at 185.
226. See id.
227. For a discussion of peer sexual harassment case law, see supra notes 96-
142 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412,
1419-20 (N.D. Iowa 1996) (finding that Burrow's Title VII based standard was ap-
propriate test for actionable claim of peer sexual harassment under Title IX);
Bruneau v. South Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 171 n.7 (N.D.N.Y.
1996) (recognizing Title VII legal standard as appropriate guide in peer hostile
environment sexual harassment case and distinguishing case at hand with Rowinsky
on grounds that Rowinsky court applied equal protection, disparate treatment anal-
ysis); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1421 (N.D. Cal. 1996)
(rejecting Rowinsky approach because Rowinsky would yield extreme results incon-
sistent with body of discrimination law and Rowinsky is based on fundamental mis-
understanding of nature of peer hostile environment sexual harassment claim);
Burrow v. Postville Community Sch. Dist., 929 F. Supp. 1193, 1205 (N.D. Iowa
1996) (concluding that Supreme Court's use of Title VII precedent in Franklin is
strong indication that Title VII is appropriate analysis for peer hostile environment
sexual harassment claim under Title IX).
229. See, e.g., Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1420 (stating that Title VII analysis is
"appropriate test for an actionable claim of peer sexual harassment under Title
IX"); Bruneau, 935 F. Supp. at 169-71 (using Title VII analysis in Title IX peer
hostile environment sexual harassment claim against school district); Burrow, 929
F. Supp. at 1205 (concluding that Title VII precedent is appropriate analysis for
peer hostile environment sexual harassment claim under Title IX).
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trict is liable for peer sexual harassment under Title IX depends on where
the court is seated rather than on precedent.
As the problem of peer sexual harassment escalates and more Title IX
cases flood the courtrooms, it is imperative to develop a uniform, analyti-
cal framework for courts to use. 2 3 0 Because congressional action on this
issue seems doubtful, the Supreme Court will eventually need to create a
framework for analyzing future Title IX cases involving school district lia-
bility for student-to-student sexual harassment.
Julie S. Lu
230. See generally Epstein, supra note 6, at Al (stating that U.S. Department of
Education is currently investigating peer sexual harassment complaints in about 80
school districts).
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